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HROUGHOUT the 1960s and 1970s the collision between the re-
claiming seller of goods and his buyer's trustee in bankruptcy consti-
tuted one of commercial law's major controversies. The divergent
results that courts reached when faced with this clash, the numerous theories
those courts employed to justify their results, and the legal confusion that
thus prevailed spawned reams of scholarly commentary. This commentary
primarily dealt with the position of the reclaiming credit seller utilizing Uni-
form Commercial Code section 2-702(2).' Occasionally, however, the dis-
tinct but related problem of the UCC cash seller 2 attracted scholarly
attention.3 After passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 4 the flow
1. For the text and basic features of U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978), see infra notes 42-52 and
accompanying text. Commentary on the U.C.C. § 2-702(2) seller's collision with the Bank-
ruptcy Act includes: Anderson, The Reclaiming Seller Under UCC Section 2-702 vs. His Four
Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 271, 282-88 (1976); Ashe, Reclamation Under
UCC-An Exercise in Futility: Defrauded Seller v. Trustee in Bankruptcy, 43 REF. J. 78, 80-83
(1969); Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured Sellers in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 24
DRAKE L. REV. 357, 364-69 (1975); Braucher, Reclamation of Goods from a Fraudulent
Buyer, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1281, 1291-98 (1967); Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N.M.L. REV. 435, 451-59 (1971); Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Credi-
tors and Defrauded Sellers-Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kra-
vitz'Case, 67 COM. L.J. 86, 87-88 (1962); Kennedy, The Interest of A Reclaiming Seller Under
Article 2 of the Code, 30 Bus. LAW. 833, 839-45 (1975); King, Reclamation Petition Granted:
In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REF. J. 81, 82 (1970); Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming
Seller and the Bankruptcy Act. A Roadmap of the Strategies, 18 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REV.
609, 616-50 (1977); Mann & Phillips, In re Federal's Inc., Another Round in the Battle Between
the Reclaiming Credit Seller and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 648-56
(1978); Mann & Phillips, The Reclaiming Seller Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act: Resolution
or Renewal of an Old Conflict?, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1, 27-70 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Mann
& Phillips III]; Shanker, Bankruptcy and Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 REF.
J. 37, 43-44 (1966); Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of U. CC. Section 2-702(3):
Another View of Lien Creditor's Rights vs. Rights of a Seller to an Insolvent, 14 W. RES. L.
REV. 93, 106-14 (1962); Siegal, Reclamation From an Insolvent Vendee-Mission Impossible?,
9 U.C.C. L.J. 27, 36-43 (1976); Weintraub & Edelman, Seller's Right to Reclaim Property
Under Section 2-702(2) of the Code Under the Bankruptcy Act: Fact or Fancy, 32 Bus. LAW.
1165, 1174-75 (1977); see also R. NORDSTROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES §§ 167-
169 (1970) (seller's remedies under UCC § 2-702); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 7-15 (1972) (seller's remedies for
buyer insolvency under UCC § 2-702). An article whose scope far exceeds the reclaiming
seller situation but which makes numerous statements on the problem is Jackson & Peters,
Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article
2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 907 (1978).
2. For a discussion of the UCC cash sale reclamation right and its operation under §§ 2-
507(3) and 2-511(3), see infra notes 53-96 and accompanying text.
3. E.g., Dugan, Cash-Sale Sellers Under Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial
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of articles on reclaiming sellers dwindled. 5 The Bankruptcy Code sought to
end the confusion regarding the reclaiming seller's position and has partially
succeeded in doing so. Although litigation concerning reclaiming credit sell-
ers has hardly ceased, 6 a stable, albeit unsatisfactory, 7 definition of the credit
seller's position has emerged.
The status of the reclaiming UCC cash seller under the Bankruptcy Code,
however, still remains uncertain. This Article aims to demonstrate that the
unpaid cash seller should be able to reclaim goods sold to a buyer who subse-
quently goes into bankruptcy. This conclusion requires discussion of consid-
erable preliminary material. First, the Article considers the position of the
reclaiming cash seller before the enactment of the UCC. Second, the Article
discusses the reclamation rights of the UCC cash seller and the confused
interaction between those rights and prior bankruptcy law. Third, employ-
ing these earlier discussions as aids in the primary task, the Article analyzes
the reclaiming cash seller's position under the Bankruptcy Code. The con-
clusion summarizes the authors' views on the range of problems that the
cash seller confronts and offers some policy considerations that underlie
those views.
I. SELLER RECLAMATION PRIOR TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
During the period preceding the states' enactment of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code the distinction between cash and credit sales was widely recog-
nized. In a credit sale the buyer received both title to the goods and
possession of those goods before paying for them.8 Title ordinarily passed at
Code, 8 U.C.C. L.J. 330, 338-40 (1976); Mann & Phillips, The Cash Seller Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 20 B.C.L. REV. 370, 395-406 (1979); Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured
Financers and the Meat Industry. An Analysis of Articles Two and Nine of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 19 B.C.L. REV. 101, 116-19 (1977).
4. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982), as amended by Act
of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 [hereinafter referred to and cited as Bank-
ruptcy Code].
5. For a discussion of the seller's position under the Bankruptcy Code, see 4 W. COL-
LIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 546.04 (L. Kinox 15th ed. 1979); J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-9 (2d ed.
1980); Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 46-69; Mann & Phillips, Section 546(c) of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act: An Imperfect Resolution of the Conflict Between the Reclaiming Seller
and the Bankruptcy Trustee, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 239, 258-72 (1980).
6. See infra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
7. Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s resolution of the problem is far from satisfactory because
the section has been consistently read as the reclaiming credit seller's exclusive recourse in
bankruptcy. See infra note 225 and accompanying text. This construction often has the effect
of preventing the seller from recovering. See infra note 306 and accompanying text. This
result is contrary to the reading of Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) that we advocated in two previ-
ous articles. See Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 51-56; Mann & Phillips, supra note 5, at
264-68. The weight of authority, however, is contrary to the position we took in those articles,
and here we assume arguendo that Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) is the exclusive provision gov-
erning the rights of those reclaiming sellers to which it applies.
8. 2 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 343, at 330 (rev. ed.
1948) (general pre-UCC rule regarding passage of title); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 235, at 1008 (1952)




the time the credit sale contract was made.9 In a cash sale,10 on the other
hand, title passed from seller to buyer only upon the buyer's payment of the
price.1 ' The seller delivered possession of the goods to the buyer with the
understanding that the buyer would pay the price at once and that title
would not pass until such payment occurred. 12
The parties' intent determined whether a transaction was to be for cash or
on credit.' 3 Absent evidence of a contrary intent, the law presumed that the
transaction was not a cash sale.14 Two clear examples of such a contrary
intent were the over-the-counter sale and the typical retail sale, in which the
buyer brings goods to a cashier for payment.' 5 The most important instance
of a cash sale, however, was the situation in which the seller parted with
possession of the goods in exchange for the buyer's check. 16 The check was
regarded as a conditional payment, 17 with title to the goods not passing until
9. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 18(1), 1 U.L.A. 311 (1950), stated that the intent of the par-
ties controls the passage of title in a contract to sell specific or ascertained goods. Id. Section
19, rule 1 declared that, absent evidence of an intent to the contrary, title passes to the buyer
upon the making of an unconditional contract for the sale of specific, deliverable goods. Id. at
323. This section also stated that whether the time of payment, or the time of delivery, or
both, be postponed was immaterial. This was the general rule, to which the cash sale was one
exception. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1060 n.10 (1954). For the rule's specific application to credit sales, see Note, The Rights of
Reclaiming Cash Sellers When Contested by Secured Creditors of the Buyer, 77 COLUM. L.
REV. 934, 935-36 & n.10 (1977).
10. Somewhat resembling the cash sale despite being basically a credit arrangement was
the pre-UCC conditional sale, which was a security device in which the seller would transfer
possession of the goods but would retain title to them until the buyer completed a series of
installment payments. Under such an arrangement, the buyer's failure to complete payment
would enable the seller to reclaim the goods. L. VOLD, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES
§ 57, at 280-81 (2d ed. 1959). In both cash and conditional sales, title remained in the seller
until payment was made, and the seller could reclaim the goods from a defaulting buyer. The
cash sale, however, differed from the conditional sale in at least two respects: (1) the cash
seller typically parted with possession in the expectation of immediate payment and thus did
not extend credit; and (2) the reservation of title until the completion of payment was often
inferred in a cash sale but express in a conditional sale. See J. WAITE, THE LAW OF SALES 78-
79, 280 (2d ed. 1938).
11. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 160.
12. J. WAITE, supra note 10, at 78. This statement might suggest that, for a cash sale to
exist, the goods and the price had to be exchanged simultaneously. Williston seemed to take
this view, defining a cash sale as one involving the transfer of both title and possession upon
payment of the price. 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 341, at 325. The dominant view, how-
ever, was that the transfer of the goods and the transfer of the price need only be substantially
simultaneous. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 164-67. The allowable time between delivery
and payment varied with the commercial setting and the particulars of the transaction, and
could range from a few minutes to several weeks. Id. at 166.
13. Note, supra note 9, at 935 n.9; Note, The "Cash Sale" Presumption in Bad Check
Cases: Doctrinal and Policy Anomaly, 62 YALE L.J. 101, 101-02 (1952).
14. See F. BURDICK, THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 58-59 (3d ed. 1913).
This presumption was contrary to an earlier tendency to assume that the sale was for cash
unless there was provision for credit. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 162.
15. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 163.
16. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 501; L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30; Note, supra note
9, at 937.
17. Williston contested this assertion, arguing that the seller assents to the transfer of full
title upon receiving the check. 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 346a. Williston, however,
admitted that his analysis was not supported by the weight of authority. Id. § 346b, at 346.
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the drawee bank paid the check.18 However, contract language such as
"Cash Sale," "Sale for Cash," and "Terms Cash" did not by itself create a
cash sale. 19
When the buyer defaulted the credit seller usually had an action for the
price. 20 Since title had already passed to the buyer at the time of the sale
contract, the seller ordinarily could not reclaim the goods.21 If the buyer's
fraud induced the sale, however, the buyer was deemed to have obtained
only voidable title, and the unpaid credit seller could rescind the contract
and recover the goods. 22 Two widely recognized situations in which rescis-
sion was available to the credit seller existed. 23 First, when the buyer re-
ceived goods on credit while not intending to pay for them, the buyer's
insolvency often assisted in proving the intent not to pay. 24 Second, rescis-
sion was also available to a credit seller when the buyer induced the sale by
making material misstatements about his financial condition. 25 On the other
hand, in a cash sale, the seller retained title to the goods until payment, and
the buyer's failure to pay entitled the seller to reclaim the goods.26 Courts
often held, however, that the seller's failure to reclaim the goods with rea-
sonable promptness waived the seller's right to repossess.27
18. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 169-70. The seller's receipt of a promissory note or a
post-dated check, however, rendered the transaction a credit sale. Id. at 170. Moreover, auc-
tion sales and C.O.D. sales generally were not regarded as cash sales. Id. § 29, at 163-64.
(auction); F. BURDICK, supra note 14, at 62-63 (C.O.D.); 2 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 345
(C.O.D.).
19. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 161-62.
20. Id. § 36, at 215; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 561.
21. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1060; Note, supra note 9, at 936. The seller in a conditional
sale, though, could reclaim upon the buyer's default. See supra note 10.
22. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 79, at 397-98; Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1059-60.
23. For a discussion of these two situations, the buyer's receipt of goods without intent to
pay and the buyer's mistatement of his financial condition, see O'Rieley v. Endicott-Johnson
Corp., 297 F.2d 1, 5 (8th Cir. 1971); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928);
3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, §§ 636, 637; Annot., 59 A.L.R. 418 (1929). The law regarding
rescission for fraud, however, tended to vary from state to state. 4A W. COLLIER, COLLIER
ON BANKRUPrcY 70.41, at 484-85 (J. Moore 14th ed. 1976).
24. 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 637, at 457. The mere receipt of the goods while
insolvent, however, without anything more, would not constitute fraud. Id.; Annot., supra
note 23, at 424. For instance, a buyer who took the goods with a reasonable, good faith intent
to pay was often regarded as not having committed fraud. In re Empire Grocery Co., 277 F.
73, 74 (D. Mass. 1921); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 51 (1952). Still, numerous cases exist regarding the
buyer's receipt of the goods while insolvent as probative of the intent not to pay for them. See,
e.g., California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d 528, 530 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Paper City
Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115, 115 (D. Mass. 1928); In re Henry Siegel Co., 223 F. 369, 370 (D.
Mass. 1915); In re Spann, 183 F. 819, 822-23 (N.D. Ga. 1910). Moreover, the seller could
sometimes rescind even when the insolvent buyer honestly intended to pay, but had no reason-
able basis for assuming that he could do so. In re Gurvitz, 276 F. 931, 932 (D. Mass. 1921);
Annot., supra note 23, at 428-30. Finally, rescission was possible in cases in which the buyer
was not insolvent, but the requisite intent could be established by other means. 3 S. WILLIS-
TON, supra note 8, § 637, at 455-56.
25. In this situation there was no requirement that the buyer be insolvent. 4A W. COL-
LIER, supra note 23, 70.41, at 487 n.15.
26. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 501 n.96; L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 161, § 30,
at 169; J. WAITE, supra note 10, at 79; Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1060 n.10.
27. What constitutes reasonable promptness would vary with the circumstances. The
case most often cited in this connection is Frech v. Lewis, 218 Pa. 141, 67 A. 45, 47 (1907)
(21/2-month delay too long). See also L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 167-69 (seller must
1985]
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One policy clearly reflected in these reclamation rules is protecting the
security of property for the original owners. 28 By enabling the cash seller to
recover in a wider range of instances than the credit seller, law prior to the
UCC emphasized this policy to a greater extent in the cash sale situation.
This differentiation reflects the different risks undertaken by cash and credit
sellers. By bargaining for a substantially simultaneous exchange of the
goods and their price rather than transferring title and possession in the ex-
pectation of future payment, the cash seller sought a degree of protection
greater than the credit seller sought. 29 Since the unpaid cash seller could
reclaim and, absent fraud, the unpaid credit seller could not, pre-UCC law
generally recognized the greater security of property for which the cash
seller had bargained. This recognition facilitated trade by giving the cash
seller a means for dealing with financially troubled buyers in relative
safety.30 The law's distinct treatment of cash and credit sellers probably also
reflected the difference in buyer behavior thought to occur in each situation.
Unlike a credit buyer's failure to pay, a reasonable man might perceive the
cash buyer's failure to pay as behavior approaching theft.3 1
Cutting against the policies of protecting seller property interests and pe-
nalizing egregious buyer behavior was the social interest in promoting the
free transferability of goods.32  This interest assumed special importance
when the reclaiming seller competed with third parties who had obtained an
interest in goods sold to the buyer. The most important such third party was
the purchaser of goods from the buyer, who might otherwise have been de-
terred from buying without legal protection against a reclaiming seller who
had sold to his seller.3 3 Courts therefore held that a defrauded credit seller
repossess promptly or lose his right to reclaim); J. WAITE, supra note 10, at 79 (seller must
repossess promptly or lose his right to reclaim). The effect of the seller's failure to reclaim
with reasonable promptness was either to convert the transaction into a credit sale or change it
into a conditional sale. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 29, at 168-69.
28. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 173.
29. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 510 F.2d 139, 144-45 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd,
526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). Nothing in the Fifth
Circuit's reversal denies this rather general proposition.
30. "A businessman in financial difficulty must be able to carry on cash transactions or go
out of business altogether. Unless we are to return to primitive commercial methods, such a
businessman should be able to use a check for payment." In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309,
311 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
31. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1060:
A reasonable man might suppose that if taking goods on credit without the in-
tention or ability to pay for them is fraud, then the same practice where the
buyer is supposed to pay cash would be the same kind of fraud. The courts have
held, however, in the cash sale situation that something more serious than
"mere" fraud is involved, something approaching theft-"larceny by trick or
device" as the time-honored phrase runs-and that consequently the defaulting
cash sale buyer gets no title . ...
32. See generally L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 172-84 (referring to the policy of pro-
moting the free transferability of goods while discussing the clash between the cash seller and
the good faith purchaser for value).
33. On the other hand, promoting the free transferability of goods by preventing the origi-
nal seller from recovering against the third-party purchaser might sometimes defeat the free
movement of goods by reducing the original seller's incentive to accept a check. See Young v.
Harris-Cortner Co., 152 Tenn. 15, 268 S.W. 125, 127 (1924).
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could not recover the goods if the third-party buyer qualified as a good faith
purchaser for value. 3 4 Originally, the unpaid cash seller fared better than
the credit seller, but eventually the cash seller also lost the ability to reclaim
from good faith purchasers for value. 35 Both the cash seller 36 and the de-
frauded credit seller, however, typically could reclaim the goods when one of
the buyer's other creditors acquired a lien on the goods.3 7 Both the cash38
and defrauded credit 39 sellers were also able to recover the goods when the
buyer subsequently went into bankruptcy.
II. THE RECLAIMING SELLER UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE AND PRIOR BANKRUPTCY LAW
While the body of pre-UCC rules just discussed was not without uncer-
tainties, those rules presented few problems when a seller with a clear right
to reclaim from the buyer confronted a bankruptcy trustee. Such a seller
34. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 79, at 400-02; 3 S. WILLISTON, supra note 8, § 650, at 503-
04; Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1060. Also, courts sometimes held that the defrauded credit
seller could lose to such secured parties as the buyer's chattel mortgagee or pledgee if these
parties were able to qualify as good-faith purchasers for value. 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages
§ 23, at 618 (1939); 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 26 (1951). Obviously, the nondefrauded credit seller
would also lose to the good faith purchaser. Since the credit seller transferred full title absent
fraud, and the buyer was ordinarily able to transfer whatever title he received, the purchaser
would be able to defeat the credit seller's reclamation attempt.
35. The unpaid cash seller was originally able to defeat purchasers from his buyer since
title never moved to the buyer, and the buyer could transfer no greater title than he possessed.
L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 172. This view, however, eventually fell out of favor in the
case of the third party who purchased in good faith and for value. On the pre-UCC confusion
in this area and the gradual trend toward favoring the good faith purchaser, see Collins, Title
to Goods Paid for with Worthless Check, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 347 (1942); Corman, Cash
Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REV. 55, 56-70 (1956);
Vold, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Conflicting Analogies, 1
HASTINGS L.J. 111, 126 (1950). Some authority existed for the proposition that the unpaid
cash seller could defeat pre-UCC secured parties such as the buyer's pledgee or chattel mortga-
gee because the failure of title to pass to the buyer precluded the existence of the pledgor or
chattel mortgagor property rights needed to create either interest. See Ison v. Cofield, 261 Ala.
296, 74 So. 2d 484, 485 (1954); Franklin Bank v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 83 Ind. App. 94, 147
N.E. 722, 723 (1925); 14 C.J.S. Chattel Mortgages § 305 (1939). Such secured parties, how-
ever, could sometimes defeat the cash seller if they qualified as good faith purchasers for value.
See 72 C.J.S. Pledges § 26 (1951).
36. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 170-71; Note, Right to Reclaim Delivered Goods in a
Cash Sale, 36 DICK. L. REV. 276, 284-85 (1932).
37. J. BENJAMIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 477-78
(7th Am. ed. 1931); F. BURDICK, supra note 14, at 205; 2 F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 924 (1901); F. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF SALES § 56, at 194 (2d ed. 1908); L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 79, at 402-03. The reasons for
this conclusion were that the buyer, who had only a voidable title, could transfer no greater
rights than he possessed, and that the lien creditor could not qualify as a good faith purchaser
for value. For a limited exception to this general rule, see infra note 120.
38. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 30, at 171. Presumably, the cash seller was unable to re-
cover the goods because the trustee could obtain no title to goods when the bankrupt buyer
also lacked title to them.
39. L. VOLD, supra note 10, § 79, at 403; Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1060. A credit seller
who had not been defrauded, however, would lose to the trustee, at least when his reclamation
was attacked as preferential. See Marks v. Goodyear Rubber Sundries, Inc., 238 F.2d 533,
534-35 (2d Cir. 1956); Plummer v. Myers, 137 F. 660, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1905). Presumably, the
credit seller's defeat reflected the fact that in such cases the buyer received full title to the
goods, a title that the trustee could assume.
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was almost always successful in bankruptcy. 4° The states' enactment of the
UCC changed this rather settled situation dramatically. The UCC's re-
claiming seller provisions provided opportunities for new attacks on the
seller's once secure position, opportunities that trustees and some bank-
ruptcy judges were quick to exploit. The resulting challenges to the seller's
ability to reclaim generated an intricate and generally incoherent body of
case law.41 This first section examines the seller's reclamation rights under
UCC sections 2-702(2), 2-507(2), and 2-511(3). Then it discusses the re-
claiming cash seller's position under prior bankruptcy law.
A. The Reclaiming Credit Seller
Under UCC section 2-702(2) the credit seller can reclaim goods sold to a
nonpaying buyer who has received the goods while insolvent. 42 Section 2-
702(2) clearly constitutes a qualified re-enactment of the seller's pre-UCC
remedy of rescission for fraud. Basing the seller's right to reclaim on the
buyer's receipt of the goods while insolvent, section 2-702(2) tracks the pre-
UCC tendency to treat the receipt of goods while insolvent as evidence of the
fraudulent intent not to pay for those goods.43 In addition, a comment to
section 2-702(2) indicates that any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent
buyer amounts to a tacit misrepresentation of solvency and therefore consti-
tutes fraud upon the seller.44 Both courts4 5 and commentators46 routinely
40. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
41. Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 1.
42. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1978). That section provides:
Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular
seller in writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does
not apply. Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right
to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of sol-
vency or of intent to pay.
Id.
Courts often hold that the UCC § 2-702(2) reclamation right does not extend to proceeds
obtained from the resale or other transfer of goods sold to the buyer. E.g., Stowers v. Mahon
(In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Party
Packing Corp. v. Rosenberg (In re Landy Beef Co.), 30 Bankr. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983);
Dopps v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 31 Bankr. 667, 669-70 (Bankr. D. Or.
1982); Ecolotec, Inc. v. Deephouse Equip. Co. (In re Deephouse Equip. Co.), 22 Bankr. 255,
258 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982). But see United States v. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
705, 712 (5th Cir. 1984) (seller's reclamation right, if properly exercised, extends to traceable
proceeds from sale of goods).
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
44. U.C.C. § 2-702 comment 2 (1978). This comment, referring to a tacit misrepresenta-
tion of solvency, could also be referring to the second typical situation giving rise to a pre-UCC
right of rescission. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
45. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc.), 524 F.2d 761,
765 (9th Cir. 1975) (§ 2-702(2) reclamation right "indistinguishable from a right to rescind a
voidable transaction" and "the exact equivalent of the common law remedy of rescission"),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 969 (1976). See also Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596
F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Telemart with approval); Bassett Furniture Indus. v.
Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 1978) (§ 2-702(2),
while not exactly like common law right of rescission, is an updating of and a substitute for
that right); In re Federal's Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 1977) (§ 2-702(2) "more than a
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regard section 2-702(2) as based on prior fraud rules. Perhaps reinforcing
section 2-702(2)'s genesis in pre-UCC law is that section's last sentence,
which seems to make the section the seller's sole fraud-based reclamation
remedy.47
In order to reclaim the goods under section 2-702(2), the credit seller must
meet that section's requirements. First, the seller must have discovered that
the buyer received the goods while insolvent.48 Second, unless there was a
written misrepresentation of solvency within three months of delivery, the
seller must have made a demand for the goods within ten days of the buyer's
receipt of those goods. The ten-day demand requirement has given rise to a
fair measure of case law discussing both the seller conduct needed for a good
demand49 and methods for computing the ten-day period during which that
mere codification of common law," but "conceptually has its antecedents in the historical and
equitable right of a defrauded seller to reclaim the goods he has sold to an insolvent buyer").
46. T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST 2-
702[A][3], at 2-405, -406 (1978):
Section 2-702 is designed to face up to an ugly fact: People who are insolvent
or on the edge of insolvency go right on buying goods on credit. The insolvent
buyer cannot pay for the goods and will never pay for them; but what does that
matter, as long as he can face his customers with a bulging inventory. What is
still worse is that it is not at all unlikely that this same sort of buyer will doctor
the records, for example, a financial statement, to lull even a questioning sup-
plier into a false sense of security ....
• ..The law has always viewed [this] situation as a species of fraud, which, of
course, it is, and has reached for the traditional remedy for transactions that are
permeated with fundamental unfairness. The deal would be called off by the
law; rescinded. This had the effect of giving the seller his goods back.
Unfortunately, . . . alleging fraud is one thing; proving it is another ....
[A]nd even if you have a solid case, the law of fraud is such a tangled maze, .
that the ultimate outcome is usually unpredictable.
It was against this background that 2-702 was written, and it advanced a new
and eminently sensible idea. Why not, it reasoned, drop all the talk of fraud and
the need to prove fraud and simply permit the seller to get his goods if the
insolvency came to light within ten days after the goods were delivered? ...
Where the buyer had furnished a phony financial statement to get the merchan-
dise, the time period could be extended; but the basic idea was the ten-day recla-
mation right-with no need to prove anything but the insolvency.
47. United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974) (sentence
eliminates common law claim by a defrauded seller); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Eli Witt
Co. (In re Eli Witt Co.), 12 Bankr. 757, 761 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (common law fraud
rescission remedy no longer exists under UCC); Kennett-Murray & Co. v. Pawnee Nat'l Bank,
598 P.2d 274, 277 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979) (§ 2-702(2) precludes all seller's equitable fraud reme-
dies except reclamation right granted by that section). Styler v. Scharf (In re Metal Tech Mfg.,
Inc.), 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 701, 704-05 (D. Utah 1979), however, states that: (1) § 2-702(2)
eliminates any common law claim by a defrauded seller for reclamation; (2) read along with
UCC § 2-721, § 2-702(2) is the exclusive provision regarding the seller's right to reclamation,
but does not affect the availability of other fraud remedies such as damages; and (3) the effect
of §§ 2-702(2) and 2-721 on fraud claims not based on misrepresentations of solvency or intent
to pay is unclear.
48. The UCC defines an insolvent party as one "who either has ceased to pay his debts in
the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent
within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law." U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1978).
49. Actual physical repossession of the goods within the ten-day period is not necessary.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 7-15, at 242. One case has suggested that "an act of
demanding or asking" may suffice. In re Childress, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 505, 507 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1969). A § 2-702(2) demand's effectiveness clearly is not precluded by the fact that it
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demand must occur. 50 Most of the cases discussing the written misrepresen-
tation exception to the ten-day demand requirement have concerned what
sorts of writings qualify as written misrepresentations. 51 Others have
was made orally. United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14 Bankr. 27, 28-
29 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980) (going to buyer's place of business and asking for meat a good § 2-
702(2) demand); Metropolitan Distribs. v. E. Supply Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 128, 134 (Ct. C.P.
Allegheny County 1959) (dictum suggesting that telephone call sufficient). One court held
that a timely demand will be effective despite the seller's knowledge of the buyer's insolvency
at the time the goods were delivered. Monsanto Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 114 Ill. App.
3d 1078, 449 N.E.2d 993, 998-99 (1983). At least two courts have gone beyond § 2-702(2)'s
literal language by requiring some sort of follow-up in addition to the demand. Bar Control v.
Gifford (In re Colacci's of America, Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118, 1120-21 (10th Cir. 1974); In re
Behring & Behring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1968), afl'd, 445 F.2d
1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1971).
Perhaps the most exhaustive discussion of the requisites for a valid § 2-702(2) demand is
contained in Butts v. Bendix Forest Prods. Corp. (In re Summit Creek Plywood Co.), 27
Bankr. 209 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982). That court discussed the demand requirement with refer-
ence to UCC § 1-201(26)'s discussion of notice, stating that notice will be sufficient if it reflects
the seller's intention to rescind the sale. Id. at 214. The court went on to say that even though
the seller's telegrammed notice referred to the seller's right of stoppage in transit rather than
the § 2-702(2) reclamation right, that did not make the notice ineffective for § 2-702(2) pur-
poses because the telegram still informed the buyer of the seller's intention to rescind. Id. The
court also stated that the notice need not go to an authorized agent of the buyer, and that the
seller was only required to make those efforts reasonably required to inform the buyer in the
ordinary course of the buyer's business. Id. For this reason, notification to an attorney known
to be previously representing the buyer was sufficient. Id.
50. The first day of the ten-day period is the day after delivery, and the period ends on the
tenth day following delivery. See Action Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enterprises, Inc. (In re Dixie
Enterprises, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 855, 857-58 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); United Beef Packers v. Lee
(In re A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14 Bankr. 27, 28 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980); In re Behring & Beh-
ring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1968). Also, two courts have held that if
the last day falls on a Sunday, the period runs until the end of the following day. In re Dixie
Enterprises, Inc., 22 Bankr. at 858; In re A.G.S. Food Sys., 14 Bankr. at 28. The date of
delivery has been held to be the day the buyer takes actual physical possession of the goods,
and not the day the seller gives the goods to a carrier. Aventura Sportswear, Ltd. v. Maloney
Enter., Inc. (In re Maloney Enter., Inc.), 37 Bankr. 290, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1983).
51. U.C.C. § 2-702 comment 2 (1978) states that "the statement of solvency must be in
writing addressed to the particular seller and dated within three months of the delivery." The
dating requirement, however, has been ignored by one case stating that the writing need only
have been presented to the seller within three months of delivery. Potts v. Mand Carpet Mills
(In re Bel Air Carpets, Inc.), 452 F.2d 1210, 1212 (9th Cir. 1971). Several courts have stated
that a check may be a written misrepresentation of solvency. In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498
F.2d 1, 4-5 (7th Cir. 1974) (but check not written misrepresentation on facts of case); Amoco
Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114, 117 (10th Cir. 1974) (check written
misrepresentation of solvency); Mullen v. Sweetheart Cup Corp. (In re Bar-Wood, Inc.), 15
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 830-32 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1974) (but check not written misrepresenta-
tion on facts of case); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107-08 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1973) (but check not written misrepresentation on facts of case); Liles Bros. & Son
v. Wright, 638 S.W.2d 383, 386-87 (Tenn. 1982) (post-dated check written misrepresentation
of solvency); Theo Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 103 Ill. App. 2d 190, 242
N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968) (but check not written misrepresentation of solvency on facts of case).
See also North Ga. Toyota v. Jahn (In re Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc.), 24 Bankr. 529, 531 n.3
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (check given after delivery of goods not written misrepresentation of
solvency).
Also, a signed purchase order indicating that payment would be made has been held not to
be a written misrepresentation of solvency. In re Regency Furniture, Inc., 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1381, 1382 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1970). The same is true for a letter admitting all sorts of
business problems, but including a payment schedule covering the total debt. In re Units, Inc.,
3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46, 47-48 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1965). Obviously, writings alleged to be
misrepresentations of solvency must make some assertion regarding the buyer's financial con-
[Vol. 39
1985] RECLAIMING CASH SELLER
grafted additional requirements onto section 2-702(2)'s language. 52
B. The Reclaiming Cash Seller
1. UCC Sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3). The UCC de-emphasizes the title
rationale on which the cash seller's common law recovery right was based.5 3
Although no UCC section is specifically identified as a cash sale provision,
sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) plainly state rules functionally equivalent to
the pre-UCC doctrine that title passes only upon payment of the price when
the parties intend a cash sale.54 Section 2-507(2) provides that when pay-
ment is due on delivery, the buyer's right to retain or dispose of the goods is
conditional upon making that payment. 55 Making the buyer's right to retain
or dispose of the goods conditional upon payment corresponds to the pre-
UCC rule that in such transactions title passed only upon payment.5 6 Sec-
tion 2-511(3) states that payment by check is conditional and, as between the
parties, is defeated by dishonor of the check when presented. 57 Under pre-
UCC law payment by check was conditional, and title would not pass until
the drawee bank paid the check. Section 2-511(3) clearly follows the first
portion of this rule, but the section does not explicitly describe the status of
goods transferred in exchange for a check which is later dishonored. As
between the seller and the buyer, however, it is hard to imagine how the
buyer could retain the goods if payment is defeated by dishonor of the check.
Accordingly, both courts 58 and commentators5 9 routinely treat sections 2-
dition. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.),
32 Bankr. 912, 921 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983) (purchase contracts, scale tickets, and grain settle-
ment records not written misrepresentations because they lacked any statements concerning
financial status). Finally, written misrepresentation must be made by the debtor himself.
Ateco Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 18 Bankr. 917, 919 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1982) (dictum) (Dun & Bradstreet report not written misrepresentation of solvency).
52. See, e.g., In re Creative Bldgs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir. 1974) (writing must be
treated by seller as representation; that is, must be relied upon in good faith and with exercise
of reasonable prudence); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107-08 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1973) (writing must be treated by seller as representation; that is, must be relied
upon with reasonable prudence); Theo. Hamm Brewing Co. v. First Trust & Sav. Bank, 103
Ill. App. 2d 190, 195, 242 N.E.2d 911, 915 (1968) (same as In re Creative Bldgs).
53. Title is relatively insignificant under the UCC. U.C.C. § 2-401 comment 1 (1978).
See also Evans Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 421 P.2d 978, 980 (1966) (title de-empha-
sized under UCC).
54. When they directly clash with pre-UCC cash sale law, UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
should displace such rules. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). Pre-UCC cash sale rules, however,
may be available to supplement §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) in situations in which these sections
do not address a particular subject. U.C.C. § 1-103 comment 1 (1978) states that the section
"indicates the continued applicability to commercial contracts of all supplemental bodies of
law except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act .... " Moreover, the legislative
and drafting history of these sections strongly suggests a general intent to adhere to pre-UCC
cash sale rules. See Mann & Phillips, supra note 3, at 376-80.
55. U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (1978), which provides "[w]here payment is due and demanded on
the delivery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain
or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due."
56. See supra text accompanying note 11.
57. U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1978), which provides that "payment by check is conditional and
is defeated as between the parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment."
58. E.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1451
(10th Cir. 1983); Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 1980); Szabo v. Vinton
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507(2) and 2-511(3) as cash sale6° provisions.61
The proper division of labor between sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) is not
completely clear. At first blush, section 2-511(3) appears to address cases in
which payment is by check, 62 and section 2-507(2) seems to encompass the
residual cash sale categories. 63 A few courts have chosen to consider check
cases under section 2-511(3) alone,64 but the majority65 have employed sec-
Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1980); Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony Bank & Trust Co.,
497 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (D. Mass. 1980); Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 324,
191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1983).
59. Referring to § 2-507(2): R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 501; T. QUINN, supra note
46, 2-507[A][4], at 2-284, 2-507[A][5], at S2-215 (Cum. Supp. 1984); Dugan, supra note 3,
at 341-42. Referring to §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3): Siegal, supra note 1, at 28-29.
60. How courts now define the contours of a cash sale is noteworthy. The mere fact that
goods are paid for by check does not make the transaction one for cash. North Ga. Toyota v.
Jahn (In re Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc.), 24 Bankr. 529, 529-30 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(delivery of car without payment, seller's retention of title certificate, and dispatch of check
upon delivery of certificate do not create cash sale because title moved to buyer upon delivery
of car). Also, a cash seller's failure to repossess unpaid for goods will change the transaction to
a credit sale. See Bar Control v. Gifford (In re Colacci's of America, Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118,
1120 (10th Cir. 1974). An established course of conduct in which the buyer issues a check for
the approximate value of goods ordered and the seller then releases the goods, with the check
being covered by a financier of the buyer, qualifies as a cash sale. Monsanto Co. v. Walter E.
Heller & Co., 114 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 449 N.E.2d 993, 994-98 (1983). Also qualifying as a cash
sale is a transaction in which, upon delivery of cattle, the seller prepared a sight draft on the
buyer and deposited the draft in his own bank, with the draft arriving at the defendant's bank
one week after delivery. See Peck v. Augustin Bros., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397, 399-400
(1979). This transaction was a cash sale because the contract required the buyer to pay the
balance of the purchase price upon completion of the contract, and no extension of credit was
contemplated. In Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1173-74 (8th Cir. 1980), the sale was for
cash even though a portion of the purchase price was paid by the buyer's personal note. The
court gave no reason for classifying the transaction as one for cash; however, the sale contract
did state that the buyer was to put $15,000 down and tender the balance upon delivery. Id. at
1173. Finally, in First Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz. 263, 645 P.2d 778, 779-80, 781-82
(1982), a deal involving a customized van was deemed a cash sale even though the buyer did
not make immediate payment, had not made immediate payment in many similar past deals,
and the seller retained the title certificate and registration slip to the van.
61. The legislative and drafting history of §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) also suggests their
relation to the pre-UCC cash sale. See Mann & Phillips, supra note 3, at 376-80.
62. This includes situations in which "the buyer 'pays' by sight draft on a commercial
firm which is financing him." U.C.C. § 2-511 comment 4 (1978). Post-dated checks, however,
are credit instruments to which § 2-511(3) does not apply. Id. comment 6.
63. We have urged this allocation of responsibility at various times. See Mann & Phillips
III, supra note 1, at 15; Mann & Phillips, The "Bad Check" Seller under UCC Section 2-
511(3), 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 329, 348-49 (1979).
64. Gicinto v. Credit Thrift of Am., 219 Kan. 766, 549 P.2d 870, 873 (1976); Conyngham
& Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 767, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 83, 86 (C.P. Luzerne County
1975); see also Swayne v. Idaho Auto Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1980) (cash sale reclamation controlled by § 2-511(3), but § 2-702(2) ten-day de-
mand provision applied); Mullen v. Sweetheart Cup Corp. (In re Bar-Wood, Inc.), 15 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 828, 829 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1974) (§ 2-511(3) alone applies to check case, but only as
between buyer and seller; § 2-702(2) must be utilized in third-party cases).
65. E.g., Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1451
(10th Cir. 1983); Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 1980); Catalina Yachts v.
Old Colony Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (D. Mass. 1980); In re Helms Veneer
Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
746, 747-48 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974); Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 321, 191
Cal. Rptr. 729, 731 (1983). A few check cases seem to proceed under § 2-507(2) alone. See
United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974); Peerless Equip.
Co. v. Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
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tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) together in cash sale cases involving checks. 66
2. The Cash Sale Reclamation Right. The cash seller proceeding under
section 2-507(2), 2-511(3), or both, may reclaim the goods from the buyer
after the buyer's failure to pay or the dishonor of the buyer's check. 67 Disa-
greement about the origin of the right to reclaim exists, however, since
neither section contains an explicit reclamation provision. Moreover, UCC
section 2-703, the general seller's remedy section, fails to include reclamation
among the remedies afforded the seller after the buyer's breach.68 Faced with
this problem, some courts have created a power to reclaim by grafting the
section 2-702(2) reclamation right onto sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3).69
Most courts, however, have either explicitly70 or inferentially 7 l regarded the
Nevertheless, no language exists in either § 2-507(2) or § 2-511(3) requiring that these two
sections be conjoined in bad check cases. Moreover, with one exception, these sections and
their comments do not cross-reference each other. The exception, U.C.C. § 2-511(3) comment
6 (1978), seems to deal solely with credit instruments such as notes and post-dated checks, and
not with checks that are used for immediate payment. See infra note 73.
66. Of course, the overwhelming preponderance of cash sale cases are check or draft
cases.
67. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 501-02, 510. Some disagreement exists regarding the
cash seller's ability to recover the proceeds of goods sold the buyer and then re-sold. Compare
Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.) (no § 2-507(2) right
to proceeds), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) with Ranchers & Farmers Livestock Auction
Co. v. Honey, 38 Colo. App. 69, 552 P.2d 313, 317 (1976) (recovery of proceeds possible when
third party did not act in good faith).
68. U.C.C. § 2-703(d) (1978), however, allows the seller to resell the goods and recover
damages. In Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators,
Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 918 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983), the court stated that, once delivery occurs,
the right to resell will be meaningless without a right to repossess. This right, the court contin-
ued, finds implied support in the conjunction of UCC §§ 2-507 and 2-511. Id.
69. In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 938, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1977) (dic-
tum); Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Richardson Homes Corp.), 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 384, 386-87 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 96, 106-07 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973); First Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz. 263, 267, 645
P.2d 778, 782 (1982); Greater Louisville Auto Auction, Inc. v. Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d
17, 20 (Ky. 1965); see also United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68
(10th Cir. 1974) (stating that § 2-507(2) should not apply when the rights of third parties are
involved, and seeming to regard § 2-702(2) as the appropriate provision in such cases); Mullen
v. Sweetheart Cup Corp. (In re Bar-Wood, Inc.), 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 829 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1974) (§ 2-511(3) only applies between seller and buyer; court suggests that § 2-702(2)
must be used in third-party cases). Finally the court in Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's
Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 918, 921-22 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1983), seemed to be of two minds on the subject, basing the right to reclaim on §§ 2-507(2) and
2-511(3) in one portion of its opinion and applying various § 2-702(2) requirements in another.
70. Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1980); Catalina Yachts v. Old
Colony Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (D. Mass. 1980); Citizens Bank v. Taggart,
143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 320, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 730-31 (1983).
71. Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1451 (10th
Cir. 1983); Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1174 (8th Cir. 1980); In re Helms Veneer Corp.,
287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968); In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa.
1962); In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1964); Ranch-
ers & Farmers Livestock Auction Co. v. Honey, 552 P.2d 313, 315 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976);
Gicinto v. Credithrift of Am., 219 Kan. 766, 549 P.2d 870, 873 (1976); Conyngham & Co. v.
Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 766-67, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 83, 86 (C.P. Luzerne County
1975); Chapman Parts Warehouse, Inc. v. Guderian, 609 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1980, no writ); Peerless Equip. Co. v. Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ).
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reclamation right as inherent to sections 2-507(2), 2-511(3), or both. 72
The majority view on the genesis of the UCC cash seller's reclamation
right is almost certainly the correct one. Section 2-702(2) expressly applies
only when the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent. Sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3), which generally do not apply to credit sales, 73 state
rules that are quite similar to pre-UCC cash sale doctrines.74 Section 2-
702(2), on the other hand, is a qualified re-enactment of the common law
remedy of rescission for fraud. These two bases for reclamation, and the
requirements for triggering each, were quite distinct prior to enactment of
the UCC. In particular, section 2-702(2)'s requirement that the buyer re-
ceive goods on credit while insolvent is rooted in pre-UCC rules for proof of
the buyer's intent not to pay75 and had no real counterpart in the cash sale
context. 76 Moreover, virtually nothing exists in sections 2-507(2) and 2-
511(3) or their comments linking these provisions to section 2-702(2). 77 Fi-
nally, section 1-103 allows common law rules to supplement the UCC.78
The cash seller's common law reclamation right thus can apply in the sec-
tion 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) context and thereby make unnecessary the basing
of that right on section 2-702(2).
3. The Ten-Day Demand Problem. Most courts, regardless of their posi-
tion on the origin of the cash sale reclamation right, apply section 2-702(2)'s
72. Also relevant is Peck v. Augustin Bros., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397, 400 (1979)
(state replevin statute employed along with UCC cash sale provisions to afford seller reclama-
tion right).
73. Sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3), however, might have some application between a
buyer and seller when the buyer offers a credit instrument. U.C.C. § 2-511 comment 6 (1978)
states:
Where the instrument offered by the buyer is not a payment but a credit in-
strument such as a note or a check postdated by even one day, the seller's ac-
ceptance of the instrument insofar as third parties are concerned, amounts to a
delivery on credit and his remedies are set forth in the section on buyer's insol-
vency. As between the buyer and the seller, however, the matter turns on the
present subsection and the section on conditional delivery and subsequent dis-
honor of the instrument gives the seller rights on it as well as for breach of the
contract for sale.
74. The drafting history of §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) also suggests that the reclamation
right is inherent to those sections. See Mann & Phillips, supra note 3, at 379, 381.
75. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 10-12, 26-27 and accompanying text.
77. Comment 3 to § 2-507, see infra note 80, which seems to make § 2-702(2)'s ten-day
demand limitation applicable in § 2-507(2) cases, does not suggest that § 2-702(2) is the source
of the cash sale reclamation right. See U.C.C. § 2-507 comment 3 (1978). To limit the seller's
power to reclaim by imposing a ten-day demand requirement is not to create that power in the
first place. Comment 3 also contains "follow-up" language, but this portion of the comment
makes no reference to § 2-702. Both the ten-day demand limitation and the follow-up require-
ment, in fact, tend to presuppose a reclamation right that somehow inheres in § 2-507(2).
Each limitation is meaningful mainly in the reclamation context, and the placement of each
beneath § 2-507 suggests that § 2-507(2) is the source of the reclamation right each presup-
poses.
It should be noted, finally, that § 2-511(3) and its comment contain no express links to § 2-
702. Comment 6 to § 2-511 does mention § 2-702, but does so in the context of credit instru-
ments such as post-dated checks. See supra note 73.
78. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
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ten-day demand limitation in cash sale cases. 79 Courts base this application
on one of section 2-507's comments, which states that the ten-day limit
within which a credit seller must reclaim goods delivered to an insolvent
buyer also applies under section 2-507.8o Nevertheless, courts proceeding
solely under section 2-511(3) in bad check cases often ignore the ten-day
demand limitation, 81 and even courts that view the cash seller's rights as
connected in some way to section 2-507(2) have occasionally rejected the
ten-day demand requirement.8 2
Imposing section 2-702(2)'s ten-day demand rule on cash sale reclama-
tions produces most unfortunate results in bad check cases. Due to the time
consumed in the check collection process, the seller often will not learn of
dishonor until after the ten-day period has passed. In such cases, the cash
sale reclamation right is rendered nugatory. 83 Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc. 84
79. E.g., Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1361 (5th Cir.
1983); Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1980); Sorrels v. Texas Bank &
Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997, 1000 (5th Cir. 1979); Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526
F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l
Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974); Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony Bank & Trust Co.,
497 F. Supp. 1227, 1237 (D. Mass. 1980); In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 846
(W.D. Va. 1968); North Ga. Toyota v. Jahn (In re Tom Woods Used Cars, Inc.), 24 Bankr.
529, 531 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (dictum); In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
938, 941 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1977) (dictum); Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Rich-
ardson Homes Corp.), 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk
Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 748 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator
Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 107 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1974). In addition, one court has re-
quired presentment of the check before the seller may reclaim, even when the seller has learned
of the buyer's insolvency before presenting the check. Catalina Yachts, 497 F. Supp. at 1237.
The court's conclusion was based on the literal language of UCC § 2-511(3) and on the policy
of encouraging sellers to present with due diligence. Id.; see U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1978).
80. U.C.C. § 2-507 comment 3 states "[s]hould the seller after making such a conditional
delivery fail to follow up his rights, the condition is waived. The provision of this Article for a
ten-day limit within which the seller may reclaim goods delivered on credit to an insolvent
buyer is also applicable here." The courts have wisely tended to ignore comment 3's ambigu-
ous follow-up language in cash sale cases. Two cases that do discuss the follow-up require-
ment appear to blur it together with the ten-day demand limitation. See Holiday Rambler
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1452 (10th Cir. 1983); Bar Control v.
Gifford (In re Colacci's of Am., Inc.), 490 F.2d 1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974).
81. See Gicinto v. Credithrift of Am., 219 Kan. 766, 549 P.2d 870, 873 (1976); Conyng-
ham & Co. v. Frank, 72 Pa. D. & C.2d 762, 20 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 83, 86 (C.P. Luzerne County
1975). But see Swayne v. Idaho Auto Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 1980) (ten-day demand requirement applies in § 2-511(3) case); Mullen v. Sweetheart
Cup Corp. (In re Bar-Wood, Inc.), 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 828, 830 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1974) (ten-
day demand rule applied in case governed by § 2-511(3), seemingly because reclamation right
based on § 2-702(2)).
82. See Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 321-23, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 731-
33 (1983) (only limitation on cash seller's right to reclaim is that it be exercised within a
reasonable period of time); see also Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 (8th Cir. 1980)
(as between seller and buyer, only limitation on seller's right to reclaim is a reasonableness
requirement); cf In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495, 497 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1964) (reclamation allowed despite two-week delay in depositing check).
83. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 503. Nordstrom has stated that:
A ten-day period for reclaiming under section 2-507(2) may be unduly short in
situations in which a check has been returned for insufficient funds. Such a
check may have passed through several indorsers and banks, not being returned
to the seller until after the buyer has had the goods for more than ten days. A
seller who has negotiated or transferred a check in the ordinary course of his
1985]
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illustrates this problem. 85 On February 18, 1977, Vinton Motors, a Vermont
automobile dealer, delivered a 1977 Oldsmobile to Bell Oldsmobile, a Massa-
chusetts dealer, in return for Bell's check drawn on a Boston bank. Vinton
deposited the check in a Vermont bank on February 22. On February 23,
Bell executed an assignment for the benefit of creditors. The assignee with-
drew all of the funds in Bell's account and deposited them in his own name
as assignee on February 24. Vinton was not notified that the check had been
dishonored until March 1. Later, Bell went into bankruptcy. Admitting the
hardship this created for the cash seller, the court of appeals nonetheless
applied the ten-day requirement and denied Vinton's claim.8 6 One of the
court's justifications for applying the demand rule to the cash seller is the
incentive it provides for prompt presentment,8 7 but prompt presentment
provides little protection against the delays inherent in the collection pro-
cess.88 The court also observed that the cash seller can defend himself by
requiring payment by certified check or by taking and perfecting a purchase
business ought not be held to have waived his demanded payment solely because
the banking process requires more than ten days to inform the seller that the
check was dishonored.
Id. (footnote omitted). Professor Robert Dugan has noted that: "[u]nder standard check-
collection procedures, ten days will elapse before the seller realizes that his buyer will not or
cannot cover the dishonored item." Dugan, supra note 3, at 346 (footnote omitted). This
problem is aggravated when the buyer and the seller are located in different communities. See
id. n.48. Consequently, "application of the ten-day rule to check-payment sales would render
reclamation relief largely illusory." Id. at 346; see also T. QUINN, supra note 46, 2-
507[A][5], at 52-200 (Cum. Supp. 1984); Siegal, supra note 1, at 35.
84. 630 F.2d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1980).
85. Also noteworthy is the situation presented by Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App.
3d 318, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983), in which Braxton Motor Company, an Oklahoma automo-
bile dealer, sold a Cadillac to Richard Taggart on May 20, 1982, and received a check for
$15,864.30 in return. The check was later returned for lack of sufficient funds. Shortly after
the sale, however, Taggart moved the car to Placer County, California. The Citizens Bank of
Roseville, which had made two unsecured loans to Taggart in 1980 and 1981, eventually se-
cured a judgment against Taggart. A writ of execution was issued, and in September 1982 the
Placer County Sheriff levied on the Cadillac. The California Court of Appeals concluded that
Braxton sold the automobile to Taggart (who immediately moved it to a dif-
ferent state) and was thereafter unable to locate the vehicle until notified by the
Placer County Sheriff that the vehicle had been seized. To argue Braxton lost
the right to reclaim because such right was not asserted within ten days of deliv-
ery places sellers such as Braxton in a no-win situation. It is difficult to conceive
of what exactly Braxton could have done to protect its rights.
191 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
86. 630 F.2d at 4. The Eighth Circuit declared that Szabo's result "tend[s] to coerce the
cash seller who reasonably expects the buyer to tender payment at delivery to go through the
cautious motions of a credit seller dealing with an economically unstable buyer." Burk v.
Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1175-76 n.6 (8th Cir. 1980).
87. Szabo, 630 F.2d at 4.
88. T. QUINN, supra note 46, 2-507[A][5], at S2-201 (Cum. Supp. 1984) has noted in
discussing Szabo that:
Presenting checks as rapidly as possible, also suggested by the court, is not
only sensible, but imperative, thanks to this type of ruling.
Will racing down to the bank, as the court also suggested, solve the problem?
Hardly. Let the seller run as fast as he can. Once the check gets in the collec-
tion system, it is beyond his control. It will move at its own pace to the payor
and, on dishonor, back to the depositary. Along the way-in both directions-
there may be many stops. It all takes time . . . and the 2-507(2) clock is run-
ning . . . running . . . running.
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money security interest in the goods sold, but both options are
burdensome.8 9
The Szabo court also commented that the hardship the ten-day demand
limitation imposes on cash sellers was no greater than that imposed on credit
sale reclamations. 90 This remark, ignores the special problems that the
check collection process poses for the cash seller. It does, however, highlight
the difficulties that the ten-day demand requirement creates for all re-
claiming sellers. In the case of the credit seller, the ten-day demand limita-
tion is imposed by the express language of section 2-702(2), but nothing in
sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) requires that this limitation govern cash sale
reclamations. Sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) largely re-enact the pre-UCC
rules regarding cash sales, rules that required only that the seller proceed
with reasonable promptness.9 1 Grafting the ten-day demand requirement
onto sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) tends to blur the distinction between
cash and credit sales, a distinction the UCC's drafters presumably wished to
preserve when they originally included these sections. Admittedly, the refer-
ence in the section 2-507 comments to the section 2-702(2) ten-day demand
limitation is not inconsistent with the language of section 2-507(2) and can
be read as merely supplementary. 92 But the UCC's comments, while quite
persuasive and frequently followed, are not law.93 Moreover, since the sec-
89. Szabo, 630 F.2d at 4 (suggesting both options). These options have been described as
unrealistic. T. QUINN, supra note 46, 2-507[A][5], at S2-217 (Cum. Supp. 1984). In this
context, a purchase money security interest is a security interest in which the goods sold serve
as the collateral securing payment of the price. U.C.C. § 9-107(a) (1978). The security inter-
est must attach in order to be enforceable between the parties. Id. §§ 9-203(1), (2). When, as
here, the goods will not remain in the secured party's possession, attachment requires the
completion of a security agreement. Id. § 9-203(l)(a). An unperfected security interest, how-
ever, is of little use if third parties acquire rights in the goods. The seller with an unperfected
purchase money security interest in the goods sold will lose to a competing lien creditor with
an interest in the goods. Id. § 9-301(l)(b). He will also lose to secured parties with a perfected
security interest, and to secured parties whose unperfected security interest attached before his.
See id. § 9-312(5). Generally speaking, the seller will also lose to subsequent purchasers of the
goods. H. BAILEY, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 232 (2d ed. 1981). The un-
perfected secured party also will not prevail against a trustee in bankruptcy, J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 24-3, and as a result will only have general creditor status in bank-
ruptcy. In order to get some measure of protection against such third parties, the seller with a
purchase money security interest will be required to perfect his security interest. Except for
purchase money interests in consumer goods other than motor vehicles or fixtures, this re-
quires filing. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1978). Perfection, however, does not afford the purchase
money secured seller complete protection against third parties. For example, the seller will
often lose to purchasers of the goods. See id. § 9-307. In some cases the seller will also lose to
prior perfected secured parties, see id. §§ 9-312(3)-(5). Finally, the seller may lose to the
trustee in bankruptcy, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 24-4.
Certification or acceptance of a check makes the drawee bank primarily liable on the check.
See U.C.C. §§ 3-410(1), 3-413(1) (1978). The bank, however, has no obligation to certify, id.§ 3-411(2), and may charge for this service. Given the previously discussed burden of employ-
ing a purchase money security interest, the wary seller may sometimes refuse to deal with
financially troubled buyers at all. Thus, the option historically provided by the cash sale doc-
trine may be precluded, depriving financially troubled buyers of that particular means for mak-
ing needed purchases.
90. 630 F.2d at 4 n.3.
91. See supra notes 27, 54-57 and accompanying text.
92. Szabo, 630 F.2d at 4.
93. Id. at 4 (conceding the point). See also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 4, at
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tion 2-507 comment does not apply to section 2-511(3), the ten-day demand
limitation should not apply to bad check cases if that section is viewed as the
appropriate and sufficient provision for such cases. 94 To summarize, noth-
ing compels courts to apply the ten-day demand limitation to the cash seller,
and significant policy considerations weigh against its application in all cash
sale contexts, especially the bad check context. Instead, courts should em-
ploy pre-UCC reasonable promptness standards, 95 or date the ten-day pe-
riod from the time the seller receives notice of dishonor.96
C. The UCC Reclaiming Seller Under Prior Bankruptcy Law
One aim of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was to end the confusion regard-
ing the UCC section 2-702(2) credit seller's ability to recover in bank-
ruptcy.97 Ironically, though, the confusion had already been substantially
reduced by the time the Reform Act took effect in 1979. At that time the
federal circuit courts considering the question were in substantial agreement
that a credit seller complying with UCC section 2-702(2)'s requirements
would defeat the trustee.98 Strangely, however, the UCC cash seller gener-
ally fared less well on the relatively infrequent occasions when he confronted
a bankruptcy trustee. 99 Trustee attacks on reclamation attempts by UCC
section 2-702(2) credit sellers proceeded under sections 70(c),1°° 67c, 10 1
12-14. Moreover, if the comments are somehow binding, courts might do well to pay more
heed to U.C.C. § 2-511 comment 4 (1978), which states: "This Article recognizes that the
taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is commercially normal and proper and, if due
diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penalized in any way."
94. See supra notes 62, 64 and accompanying text.
95. See Burk v. Emmick, 637 F.2d 1172, 1176 (8th Cir. 1980); Citizens Bank v. Taggart,
143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733 (1983).
96. Cf Holiday Rambler Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 723 F.2d 1449, 1452-53
(10th Cir. 1983) (court raised this possibility, but was not required to decide the time from
which the demand period runs).
97. See infra note 215.
98. See Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979);
Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 998
(8th Cir. 1978); In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 1977); Alfred M. Lewis, Inc.
v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enters., Inc.), 524 F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1975). The one appar-
ent exception to this circuit-level consensus that the UCC § 2-702(2) seller should triumph, In
re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820, 822 (3d Cir. 1960), was in reality decided on a basis that favored the
seller in most states. See infra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
99. The decisions favoring the trustee over the UCC cash seller are: Stowers v. Mahon
(In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976); Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Richardson Homes Corp.), 18 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
746, 749 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 109
(Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973); cf Bar Control v. Gifford (In re Colacci's of Am., Inc.), 490 F.2d
1118, 1121 (10th Cir. 1974) (repossession by cash seller-turned-credit-seller a voidable prefer-
ence).
The decisions favoring the UCC cash seller are: In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D.
Pa. 1962); Swayne v. Idaho Auto Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1980); In re Lindenbaum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495, 496 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1964);
Peck v. Augustin Bros., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1979); see also In re Helms
Veneer Corp., 287 F. Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968) (distinguishing Mort, but seemingly
willing to allow cash seller to defeat trustee in an appropriate case).
100. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(c), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (as amended), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682.
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64,102 and 60103 of the old Bankruptcy Act. Only Bankruptcy Act sections
70(c) and 60, however, were employed in cash sale litigation. This section of
the Article focuses on the rights of the reclaiming cash seller under these two
sections.
1. The Cash Seller Under Bankruptcy Act Section 70(c). Section 70(c) of
the Bankruptcy Act provided the trustee with the rights and powers of a so-
called "ideal lien creditor."'' °4 By its terms, the section armed the trustee
with every right and power state law gave to its most favored creditor who
had acquired a lien by legal or equitable proceedings.' 0 5 The lien creditor,
whose rights the trustee assumed, was purely hypothetical. 106 Section 70(c)
did not require the trustee to locate an existing creditor who had, or could
have obtained, a lien. This hypothetical lien holder was regarded as having
obtained the lien on the date of bankruptcy. 0 7 The trustee's ability to pre-
vail under section 70(c) depended on whether such a lien creditor could have
defeated the reclaiming seller under state law.'0 8
a. The UCC Section 2-702 Backdrop. Consideration of the UCC cash
seller's ability to defeat a trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Act section
70(c) requires a brief discussion of the confused struggle between the UCC
section 2-702(2) seller and the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee.'°9 Res-
olution of this conflict depended on whether the UCC section 2-702(2) seller
could defeat a party possessing lien creditor status on the date of bank-
ruptcy. At first glance, the 1962 version of UCC section 2-702(3) seemed to
yield a ready answer to this question. This subsection provided that the
seller's right to reclaim under UCC section 2-702(2) was subject to the rights
101. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 67c, 30 Stat. 544, 564 (as amended), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 [here-
inafter cited as Bankruptcy Act].
102. Bankruptcy Act § 64.
103. Id. § 60.
104. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 70(c), 52 Stat. 840, 881 (as amended), repealed by
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, § 401, 92 Stat. 2549, 2682,
provided that:
"the trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of...
a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien on all property by
legal or equitable proceedings upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a
simple contract could have obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists.
This language tends to parallel the definition of a lien creditor contained in U.C.C. § 9-301(2)
(1978), which in relevant part defines a lien creditor as "a creditor who has acquired a lien on
the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like," and as "a trustee in bankruptcy from
the date of the filing of the petition .... "
105. In re Waynesboro Motor Co., 60 F.2d 668, 669 (S.D. Miss. 1932).
106. J. MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 186 (1956).
107. Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961). One court, however,
held that the obligation underlying the hypothetical lien need not have been created at any
particular time. In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 1977).
108. Bassett Furniture Indus. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 994
(8th Cir. 1978) (rights of hypothetical lien creditor to be determined by state law).




of a buyer in ordinary course of business, another good faith purchaser, or a
lien creditor (with a cross-reference to UCC section 2-403).110 A few courts
interpreted this version of section 2-702(3) as directly subordinating the
UCC section 2-702(2) seller to a lien creditor and thus to the trustee. I' The
weight of federal authority, however, held to the contrary. 11 2
The courts deciding that the UCC section 2-702(2) seller defeated a
trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) utilized a variety of
approaches. Crucial to the rationale many of these courts used was that,
read literally, the 1962 version of UCC section 2-702(3) subordinates the
seller to a lien creditor's rights under UCC section 2-403 and not to the lien
creditor himself. 113 Section 2-403's only statement about the lien creditor's
rights, 14 however, is that those rights are governed by the UCC Articles on
Secured Transactions, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title.' 1 5 Ignoring
the latter two articles as irrelevant to the seller/trustee situation, the courts
focused on the Article on Secured Transactions 16 (article 9). At this point,
however, the courts parted company. The Third Circuit's well-known deci-
sion in In re Kravitz1 17 focused on UCC section 9-301(3)'s definition of the
term lien creditor, noted that the definition included the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, and read that section as consistent with section 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.' 18 After apparently coming to the conclusion that the UCC did
110. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962) (amended 1978).
111. Styler v. Scharf (In re Metal Tech Mfg., Inc.), 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 701, 706-07 (D.
Utah 1979); In re E. Supply Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 151, 153-54 (W.D. Pa. 1963) (using an
earlier version of § 2-702), affid, 331 F.2d 852 (3d Cir. 1964); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Eli Witt Co. (In re Eli Witt Co.), 12 Bankr. 757, 760 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Goodson
Steel Corp., 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 387, 391-93 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1968); In re Behring & Beh-
ring, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 600, 606-07 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1968), afid, 445 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.
1971); In re Units, Inc., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 46, 48-49 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1965). The affir-
mances in Behring and Eastern Supply did not discuss the issue presented by the text accompa-
nying this note.
112. Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596 F.2d 853, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1979);
Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 994-
1000 (8th Cir. 1978); In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511-16 (6th Cir. 1977); see also
Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.),
403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968) (involving contest between seller and lien creditor, not
trustee); In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 64-65 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1970)
(following Mel Golde); cf United States v. Westside Bank, 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 705 (5th Cir.
1984) (seller defeats general unsecured creditor of buyer). But see In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820,
821-22 (3d Cir. 1960) (holding for the trustee under Bankruptcy Act § 70(c)). The Kravitz
reasoning, however, would have favored the seller in most states. See infra notes 117-23 and
accompanying text. Following the Kravitz rationale is In re Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 22 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 938, 943-44 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1977).
113. See, e.g., In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1977) (following Mel
Golde); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d
820, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1960).
114. The lien creditor is almost certainly not a good faith purchaser entitled to defeat the
credit seller under U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978). See infra note 183.
115. U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (1978).
116. See, e.g., In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1977) (following Mel
Golde); In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Kravitz, 278
F.2d 820, 821-22 (3d Cir. 1960).
117. 278 F.2d 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
118. Id. at 822. The court stated:
We think the correct way to put the matter is that by federal law the trustee in
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not resolve the credit seller/lien creditor controversy, the court turned to
pre-UCC state law to resolve the issue.1 9 Since the state in question, Penn-
sylvania, had adopted a minority rule whereby a lien creditor whose lien on
the goods resulted from credit extended subsequent to the sale would defeat
a defrauded seller,' 20 the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee emerged vic-
torious.' 2 ' In most states, however, the lien creditor lost to a defrauded
seller,' 22 and as a result the Kravitz rationale generally favored the UCC
section 2-702(2) seller.' 23 The other courts, rejecting a literal application of
UCC section 2-702(3) and looking to article 9, focused on UCC section 9-
301(l)(b) rather than section 9-301(3).124 Section 9-301(l)(b) subordinates
an unperfected secured party to a lien creditor. 25 Holding that the UCC
section 2-702(2) reclamation right is not a security interest, 26 these courts
also turned to pre-UCC law to resolve the seller/lien creditor clash. In each
case the relevant state's pre-UCC law supported a seller recovery. 127
Other courts favoring the section 2-702(2) seller ignored article 9 and em-
ployed different arguments for the seller's recovery. The Ninth Circuit em-
ployed a straight forward pre-UCC rationale, reasoning that UCC section 2-
702 authorized the equivalent of common law rescission for fraud, and that
sales under that section resulted in a transfer of only voidable title. ' 28 Conse-
quently, the seller's right could only be cut off by a good faith purchaser for
value, and since the bankruptcy trustee was not a good faith purchaser, but
bankruptcy is made a lien creditor and that this right thus given him is recog-
nized by the Uniform Commercial Code which simply states the power of the
trustee as created by the prevailing law, that is, the federal law of bankruptcy.
Id.
119. See id.
120. The cases on which the Kravitz court relied were Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. 258,
263-64, 27 A. 300, 301-02 (1893); Smith v. Smith, Murphy & Co., 21 Pa. 367, 373 (1853);
Mann v. Salsberg, 17 Pa. Super. 280, 285 (1901). The reasoning behind these cases appears to
have been that, because of the buyer's apparent absolute ownership of the goods and the credi-
tor's right to rely on this, the creditor should be treated like a good faith purchaser, who could
recover against a defrauded seller. See Schwartz v. McCloskey, 156 Pa. at 263-64, 27 A. at
301-02. The general rule, however, was that the lien creditor could not qualify as a good faith
purchaser for value. See supra note 37.
121. 278 F.2d at 822-23.
122. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
123. "The rule is well settled in most states that the seller's right to rescind on grounds of
fraudulent misrepresentation of solvency is not cut off by a levying creditor. Consequently, it
is possible to explain-and correctly explain-the Kravitz Case as an anomaly peculiar to
Pennsylvania." Hawkland, supra note 1, at 88 (footnotes omitted); see also Permanent Edito-
rial Board Note on 1966 amendment to U.C.C. Section 2-702 (law of most states differed from
Pennsylvania rules applied in Kravitz, and in such states reclamation right "fully effective"),
reprinted in U.C.C. REP. SERV. CURRENT MATERIALS (CALLAGHAN) 2702, at 128 (1979).
124. In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1968); see also In re
Federal's, Inc, 553 F.2d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1977) (following Mel Golde); In re Royalty
Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C Rep. Serv. 61, 64 (E.D. Tenn. 1970) (following Mel Golde).
125. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1978).
126. See infra notes 145-75 and accompanying text.
127. See In re Federal's, Inc., 553 F.2d 509, 514-15 (6th Cir. 1977); In re Mel Golde Shoes,
Inc., 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Royalty Homes, Inc., 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 65
(E.D. Tenn. 1970).
128. Ray-O-Vac v. Daylin, Inc. (In re Daylin, Inc.), 596 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1979).
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only a lien creditor, the seller triumphed. 129 An Eighth Circuit decision,1 30
favoring the reclaiming credit seller, did so virtually by fiat. After exhaus-
tively discussing and attacking almost every conceivable argument concern-
ing the seller/trustee clash, the court concluded that under Missouri law a
lien creditor could not cut off the seller's right to reclaim under UCC section
2-702(2) because the purpose of that section was to simplify and expand the
seller's right to reclaim. 13 1
Whatever one might think of the reasoning employed in these various
cases, they did establish a substantial circuit-level consensus in favor of the
UCC section 2-702(2) seller who was confronted by a bankruptcy trustee
utilizing Bankruptcy Act section 70(c). Further solidifying the seller's posi-
tion was the UCC Permanent Editorial Board's 1966 decision to eliminate
section 2-702(3)'s "or lien creditor" language. 132 Although taken literally
the amendment does not definitively resolve the seller/lien creditor contro-
versy, the amendment has generally been construed to require that the seller
triumph. 133 Thus the trustee apparently was completely precluded from
mounting a successful Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) attack in those states
adopting the amendment.
b. Bankruptcy Act Section 70(c) and the Cash Seller. The decisions
presenting a clash between the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee and the
reclaiming UCC cash seller were a mixed lot, some holding for the seller134
and others for the trustee. 135 The cases supporting the trustee did so on one
of two grounds: (1) that the cash seller was subordinate to a lien creditor
129. Id. The court relied on its earlier decision in Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re
Telemart Enters., Inc.), 524 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1975).
130. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d
992, 992 (8th Cir. 1978).
131. See id. at 994-1000.
132. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Report
No. 3, at 3 (1967). See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1972 version).
133. E.g., Braucher, supra note 1, at 1298 (hopefully the amendment will "validate the
right to reclaim stated in section 2-702 according to the terms of that section, in bankruptcy as
well as out"); Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 939 (if legislative history means anything, it
means that drafters intended that lien creditors should usually lose); King, supra note 1, at 81
(amendment means that trustee "will lose all hope of defeating a reclaiming seller with any
power granted the trustee by § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act"); see also Hawkland, supra note
1, at 88 (intention of amendment to adopt Kravitz rule, "as correctly read and applied"). Pro-
fessor Hawkland had earlier rejected a possible reading of Kravitz that saw the case as inevita-
bly subordinating the seller to the trustee-as-lien creditor. Id.
134. See In re Mort Co., 208 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Swayne v. Idaho Auto
Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1980); see also In re Linden-
baum's, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 495, 497 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1964) (holding for seller, but
Bankruptcy Act section invoked by trustee unclear); cf In re Helms Veneer Corp., 287 F.
Supp. 840, 845-46 (W.D. Va. 1968) (distinguishing Mort, but seemingly willing to hold for
cash seller in an appropriate case); Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 326, 191
Cal. Rptr. 729, 734 (1983) (cash seller defeats lien creditor).
135. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976); Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Richardson
Homes Corp.), 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabinets,
Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 749 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974); In re Fairfield Elevator Co., 14
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 96, 111 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1973); cf Greater Louisville Auto Auction v.
Ogle Buick, Inc., 387 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Ky. 1965) (cash seller defeats party with competing
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under UCC section 2-702(3), or (2) that the cash sale reclamation right was
a security interest, which, if not perfected, was subordinate to a lien creditor
under UCC section 9-301(l)(b).
The cases holding that the UCC cash seller lost to the trustee because the
cash seller was subordinate to a lien creditor under UCC section 2-702(3)136
did not invoke Bankruptcy Act section 70(c). Rather, the cases held that
because UCC section 9-301(3)'s definition of the term lien creditor includes a
trustee in bankruptcy,13 7 the cash seller lost to the trustee under the UCC
itself. Since the trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) was
entitled to sit in the shoes of the lien creditor, and since UCC section 9-
301(3) has been read as recognizing the trustee's status under Bankruptcy
Act section 70(c), treating these decisions as if they had invoked Bankruptcy
Act section 70(c) is appropriate. In any event, the reasoning employed in
these cases was almost certainly fallacious. Unless UCC section 2-702(2) is
recognized as the source of the cash sale reclamation right, nothing links
UCC section 2-702(3) to UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3). The cash sale
reclamation right should be regarded as inherent to UCC sections 2-507(2)
and 2-511(3), and as in no way based on UCC section 2-702(2).138 Thus,
UCC section 2-702(3) has no application to cash sale reclamations.
Even assuming arguendo that UCC section 2-702(3) somehow does apply
to the UCC cash seller, that section should not subordinate such a seller to a
lien creditor. The only intelligible way to make UCC section 2-702(3) appli-
cable to cash sale reclamations is to base the cash reclamation right on UCC
section 2-702(2). In this event the body of UCC section 2-702(2) cases deal-
ing with the credit seller/lien creditor controversy must apply to cash sale
reclamations as well. The bulk of authoritative precedent dealing with this
question let the seller win outright or concluded that a reversion to pre-UCC
law was necessary. 139 Under pre-UCC law, the cash seller defeated both the
lien creditor and the trustee. 14 Finally, the argument that the Bankruptcy
Act section 70(c) trustee defeated the cash seller under UCC section 2-
702(3) plainly was of no avail in states deleting the original "or lien creditor"
language from UCC section 2-702(3).141 In these states a cash seller whose
reclamation right was assumed to arise under UCC section 2-702(2) should
interest in goods, but only because that party is neither a good faith purchaser nor a lien
creditor).
136. See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 387 (N.D. Ind. 1975);
cf In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 746, 749 (M.D. Ga. 1974) (arguably using
UCC § 2-702(3) to subordinate seller to lien creditor).
137. See supra note 104.
138. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. Of course, UCC § 2-702(2)'s ten-day
demand requirement may apply to the reclaiming cash seller, but this requirement is due to the
language of U.C.C. § 2-507(2) comment 3 (1978). See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying
text.
139. See supra notes 109-31 and accompanying text. For some courts, necessary to this
argument was the assertion that UCC § 2-702(2) did not create a security interest. See supra
note 126 and accompanying text. We conclude, however, that UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
do not create security interests. See infra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 36, 38 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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have been victorious either because of the pro-seller reading typically given
the amendment,1 42 or through recourse to pre-UCC law.143
The other possible attack on the cash seller's ability to recover in bank-
ruptcy centered on UCC section 9-301(l)(b), which subordinates an un-
perfected security interest to the rights of a lien creditor whose lien attaches
before the security interest is perfected.144 Thus, if the cash sale or its asso-
ciated reclamation right involves an unperfected security interest, the cash
seller loses to the trustee, the ideal lien creditor.1 4 5 They could be so treated
only if they qualify as so-called article 2 security interests. The controlling
provision for these security interests is UCC section 9-113.146 Under that
section, once the buyer lawfully obtains possession of the goods, a security
agreement is needed to make the security interest enforceable,1 47 and the
holder of the security interest must ordinarily file a financing statement' 48 to
142. See supra note 133.
143. See infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
144. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978).
145. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1246-48 (5th Cir.) (dic-
tum on Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) point), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976). But see Swayne v.
Idaho Auto Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1980) (cash seller
defeats trustee under Bankruptcy Act, § 70(c) despite argument that seller has unperfected
security interest).
146. U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978) provides that:
A security interest arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) is subject
to the provisions of this Article except that to the extent that and so long as the
debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) No security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforce-
able; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed by
the Article on Sales (Article 2).
Even when UCC § 9-113 dispenses with the need for a security agreement and a properly filed
financing statement, however, article 9 third-party priority rules still apply. J. WHITE & R.
SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-10, at 898.
Moreover, U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 1 (1978) provides:
Under the provisions of Article 2 on Sales, a seller of goods may reserve a secur-
ity interest (see, e.g., Sections 2-401 and 2-505), and in certain circumstances,
whether or not a security interest is reserved, the seller has rights of resale and
stoppage under Sections 2-703, 2-705 and 2-706 which are similar to the rights
of a secured party. Similarly, under such sections as Sections 2-506, 2-707 and
2-711, a financing agency, an agent, a buyer or another person may have a secur-
ity interest or other right in goods similar to that of a seller. The use of the term
"security interest" in the Sales Article is meant to bring the interests so desig-
nated within this Article.
As this language indicates, § 9-113 generally covers nonconsensual interests that arise by oper-
ation of law in the course of a sales transaction. Id. comment 2. A conspicuous exception to
this generalization, however, is id. § 2-401(1), the relevant portion of which declares: "Any
retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or delivered to the
buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest."
147. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (1978). The security agreement must be signed by the debtor
and must contain a description of the collateral. Id. It must also contain language creating or
providing for a security interest. Id. § 9-105(1)(k). Section 9-203(l)(a) also provides for at-
tachment without a security agreement when the secured party is in possession of the collat-
eral, but this possibility is excluded by hypothesis when the buyer has lawfully obtained
possession of the goods.
148. See id. § 9-302. Id. § 9-302(l)(d) provides that a purchase money security interest in
consumer goods does not require filing in order to be perfected. Also, certain situations exist
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perfect the interest.' 49
The courts considering the matter have generally concluded that UCC
section 2-702(2) does not create a security interest, 150 and sound reasons
exist for this conclusion. First, UCC section 2-702 is not contained in the
UCC section 9-113 comment listing security interests to which UCC section
9-113 applies. 15 1 Second, the UCC section 2-702(2) reclamation right can-
not be exercised in such a way as to allow the seller to benefit from UCC
section 9-113. According to UCC section 9-113, the rights or interests that
section protects are exempted from article 9 requirements so long as the
buyer does not have or obtain possession of the goods. 152 The reclamation
right established by UCC section 2-702(2), however, cannot arise until after
the seller yields possession to the buyer because this right is premised on the
buyer's receipt of the goods while insolvent. Thus, the UCC section 2-702(2)
reclamation right cannot be exercised in a manner entitling it to the UCC
section 9-113 exemption from article 9's requirements.' 53 To include UCC
in which a security interest may be perfected by the secured party's possession of the collateral.
Id. §§ 9-302(l)(a), 9-305. These situations are excluded by hypothesis, however, when the
debtor has lawfully obtained possession of the goods.
149. Id. § 9-113 comment 3; see also Putterbaugh v. Fournier (In re Happy Jack's Restau-
rant, Inc.), 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 653, 657-60 (Bankr. D. Me. 1980) (seller must perfect by
filing to defeat trustee proceeding under UCC § 9-301(1)(b); because filing improper, trustee
wins).
150. E.g., Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear (In re PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583
F.2d 992, 998-99 (8th Cir. 1978); Johnston & Murphy Shoes, Inc. v. Meinhard Commercial
Corp. (In re Mel Golde Shoes, Inc.), 403 F.2d 658, 660 (6th Cir. 1968); In re American Food
Purveyors, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 436, 440-41 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1974); English v. Ralph
Williams Ford, 17 Cal. App. 3d 1038, 1047, 95 Cal. Rptr. 501, 506 (1971); Ranchers & Farm-
ers Livestock Auction Co. v. First State Bank, 531 S.W.2d 167, 169 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Styler v. Scharf (In re Metal Tech Mfg., Inc.), 27
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 701, 706-07 (D. Utah 1979); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Eli Witt Co. (In
re Eli Witt Co.), 12 Bankr. 757, 760-61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
151. U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 1 (1978); see supra note 146.
152. U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978). Thus a security interest contemplated by UCC § 9-113 is ef-
fectively enforceable and perfected, and its holder has enhanced rights against third parties,
until the debtor obtains lawful possession. What are those enhanced rights? For example,
although the UCC does not expressly deal with the point, a secured party who perfects before
the creation of the lien creditor's lien will defeat such a lien creditor. H. BAILEY, supra note
89, at 278. A secured party with an unperfected security interest or a secured party who
perfects after the creation of the lien creditor's lien, however, will lose to a lien creditor.
U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1978). If a secured party files with respect to a purchase money security
interest within ten days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, however, the
secured party takes priority over rights of a lien creditor that arise between the time the secur-
ity interest attaches and the time of filing. Id. § 9-301(2). Moreover, a secured party who files
or perfects before another secured party files or perfects has priority over the second secured
party. Id. §§ 9-312(3), (4). An unperfected secured party, however, generally loses to a per-
fected secured party. H. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 230.
153. U.C.C. § 9-113 (1978) states that "so long as the debtor does not have or does not
lawfully obtain possession of the goods . . . (c) the rights of the secured party on default by
the debtor are governed by the Article on Sales (Article 2)." This language clearly envisions
that certain situations exist in which the rights of article 2 secured parties covered by UCC § 9-
113 will be governed by the provisions of article 2. Since the UCC § 2-702(2) reclamation
right cannot arise until after the goods have moved to the buyer and UCC § 9-113 imposes
article 9 attachment and filing requirements once this has happened, it is difficult to see how
the § 2-702(2) seller could ever avail himself of the opportunity to utilize his article 2 reclama-
tion right if § 2-702(2) is included within § 9-113. Thus, to assume that § 2-702(2) was in-
tended to be within § 9-113's coverage is implausible. This conclusion might be avoided,
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section 2-702(2) within UCC section 9-113's coverage is to deny the re-
claiming seller section 9-113's benefits, enhanced protection against various
third parties, while exposing the seller to section 9-113's disadvantages, for
example, the perfection needed to defeat the lien creditor and the Bank-
ruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee.' 54
Third, including the UCC section 2-702(2) seller within UCC section 9-
113 would emasculate section 2-702(2). Holding that section 2-702(2)'s ef-
fective right to rescind for fraud is a security interest subject to article 9
leads to the absurd conclusion that the seller could not reclaim from the
buyer unless the buyer signed a written agreement providing such a right as
required by UCC section 9-203.155 Finally, UCC section 2-702(2)'s rescis-
sion remedy does not comport with the UCC's definition of a security inter-
est' 56 because section 2-702(2) does not secure payment but rather serves as
a substitute for payment. '57
If the UCC cash sale reclamation right is based on UCC section 2-702(2),
the cases and arguments just discussed should also have disposed of the con-
tention that UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) were unperfected security
interests defeated by a bankruptcy trustee who assumed a lien creditor's po-
sition under UCC section 9-301(l)(b). If the UCC cash sale reclamation
right is regarded as inherent to UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3),158 the
above arguments should have been highly persuasive in the cash sale con-
text. The cases holding that the cash seller is an unperfected secured party,
however, focus less on the nonconsensual cash sale reclamation right than on
the rationale supposedly underlying that right.' 59 Specifically, these cases
however, if it is assumed that the buyer subject to § 2-702(2) has not lawfully obtained posses-
sion of the goods. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 152.
155. Braucher, supra note 1, at 1290. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1978) is article 9's attachment provi-
sion. See supra note 147.
156. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978).
157. "[A] right to rescind is a right to undo the transaction-to reclaim the goods as a
substitute for the price-not a right to 'secure' payment of the price as required by the defini-
tion of 'security interest'; under section 2-702(3), successful reclamation 'excludes all other
remedies'." Braucher, supra note 1, at 1290 (footnote omitted). For an attack on this argu-
ment, see Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 928-29.
158. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text. This view of the cash sale reclamation
right is, of course, our own.
159. Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1246-48 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), held that the UCC cash sale reclamation right was a security
interest, and went on to note in dictum that, since the seller had not perfected, he would lose to
the trustee under UCC § 9-301(l)(b) and Bankruptcy Act § 70(c). Other cases have held,
stated, or implied that the cash sale reclamation right is a security interest in situations in
which the seller confronted a secured party. See United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505
F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974); First Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz. 263, 645 P.2d 778,
782 (1982) (express reservation of title as well); Hardick v. Hill, 403 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Bank of Madison v. Tri-County Livestock Auction Co., 123 Ga. App.
768, 182 S.E.2d 687, 689 (express reservation of title as well), rev'd on other grounds, 228 Ga.
325, 185 S.E.2d 393, vacated, 125 Ga. App. 126, 186 S.E.2d 542 (1971); Peerless Equip. Co. v.
Azle State Bank, 559 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, no writ). But see
Swayne v. Idaho Auction (In re Shoemaker), 4 Bankr. 505, 506 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1980) (cash
seller defeated trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) despite argument that cash
seller was unperfected secured party); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank,
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revert to the pre-UCC conception of a cash sale160 by treating a cash sale as
a retention or reservation of title to the goods under UCC section 2-
401(1).161 Once the buyer has or lawfully obtains possession of the goods
sold, it was argued, the cash seller had to perfect his security interest in
order to defeat a lien creditor and the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c)
trustee.1 62 This argument misrepresented the nature of the UCC cash sale.
Section 2-401 proclaims that the seller's rights and remedies apply irrespec-
tive of title to the goods. 163 To be sure, UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
state rules functionally equivalent to the pre-UCC doctrine that title passed
only upon payment in a cash sale, but nowhere do they specifically refer to
title. No retention or reservation of title on the seller's part is needed for
these sections to operate.164
The argument for the seller's subordination to the lien creditor and the
trustee under UCC section 2-401 also suffered from the other problems
noted in the UCC section 2-702(2) context.1 65 Sections 2-507(2) and 2-
511(3) are not contained in the commentary listing the article 2 security
interests covered by section 9-113 and cannot be employed to afford the
seller section 9-113's benefits.166 Further, to treat sections 2-507(2) and 2-
511(3) as security interests is to weaken substantially the cash sale reclama-
tion right, the existence of which no one denies. 167 Finally, characterizing
the cash sale reclamation right 168 as a security interest is at odds with the
nature of the underlying transaction.169 If UCC section 2-401(1) has any
application to cash sales, that application should be limited to situations in
184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354, 359-60 (1974) (rejecting argument that cash seller was un-
perfected secured party).
160. See supra notes 10-12, 26 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 146. This argument could not be employed in the case of UCC § 2-
702(2), because that section's common law antecedents were not premised on a reservation of
full title by the seller. See supra notes 8, 20-25 and accompanying text.
162. See Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1248 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
163. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1978). Id. comment 1 states in part that the UCC Article on Sales
"deals with the issues between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or non-
performance under the contract for sale and not in terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods
has passed."
164. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text; see also Myers v. Columbus Sales Pavil-
ion, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 805, 808 (D. Neb.) (§§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) do not depend on title and
do not implicate § 2-401(1)), affd, 723 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1983).
165. See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
166. The cash seller who tenders the goods can no doubt refuse to transfer possession to a
buyer who refuses to make payment. U.C.C. § 2-507(1) (1978). Sections 2-507(2) and 2-
511(3), on the other hand, are usually employed to provide a reclamation right for the unpaid
seller who has already delivered the goods to the buyer. Dugan, supra note 3, at 344-45.
167. See Dugan, supra note 3, at 344-45.
168. The cash sale reclamation right, like the § 2-702(2) reclamation right, is basically a
power to undo the transaction.
169. The most common situation in which a seller retains a security interest in goods he
sells is a credit transaction in which the interest is taken to secure payment of the price. The
cash sale by definition does not contemplate an extension of credit. The cash seller transfers
the goods thinking that he is receiving substantially simultaneous payment, and has no appar-
ent need to secure the price. See Dugan, supra note 3, at 344 (arguing that the cash seller is
excluded from UCC § 1-201(37)'s definition of the term "security interest" because this defini-
tion refers to situations involving an extension of credit).
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which the seller and the buyer expressly agree that the seller reserves title. 170
This is consistent with section 2-401(l)'s aim of ensuring that true security
devices are subject to article 9 requirements.1 7 1
Finally, the UCC cash and credit sellers should have defeated the trustee
under Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) even if their rights were treated as se-
curity interests. According to UCC section 9-113, such interests are not sub-
ject to article 9 attachment and filing requirements so long as the debtor
lacks possession of the goods or does not lawfully obtain their possession.
Taking possession of goods on credit while insolvent or taking goods in ex-
change for a bad check is not a lawful obtaining of possession. 172 In such
cases the rights of the putative security interest holder, the seller, are gov-
erned by article 2, not article 9,173 and the seller therefore would defeat the
lien creditor and the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee. 174 Alternatively,
an unpaid seller may have been able to avoid the claims of a Bankruptcy Act
section 70(c) trustee by repossessing the goods after the buyer obtained pos-
session. 175 If valid, this argument presumably would have held even if the
170. U.S. Billiards Co. v. Greenberger (In re Bensar Co.), 36 Bankr. 699, 702 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1984) (signed writing evidencing intention to create security interest required); cf First
Nat'l Bank v. Smoker, 153 Ind. App. 71, 286 N.E.2d 203, 211 (1972) (explicit agreement
under § 2-401(1) needed to alter § 2-401(2)'s rule that title passes to buyer at time and place
seller completes delivery). The clearest type of agreement intended to be covered by UCC § 2-
401(l)'s "retention or reservation" language is a transaction corresponding to the pre-UCC
conditional sale. See Dugan, supra note 3, at 343 (conditional sale archetypal instance of title
retention); Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 918-20 (clearly identifying § 2-401(1) with the
conditional sale transaction).
171. R. NORDSTROM, supra note 1, at 380-81. The main point, presumably, is that express
reservations of title should be subjected to article 9 requirements in order to afford third parties
the notice that article 9 perfection procedures provide.
172. See Braucher, supra note 1, at 1290; Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 929-30; Wise-
man, supra note 3, at 148-49. "The seller reclaiming under sections 2-507 or 2-702 appears to
be a prime candidate to assert a claim that the buyer-debtor did not 'lawfully obtain posses-
sion'; indeed, no other claim founded in Article 2 seems to come close." Jackson & Peters,
supra note 1, at 929.
173. U.C.C. § 9-113(c) (1978). When the rights of parties other than the debtor-buyer are
involved, however, article 9 should control priorities between the seller and these third parties.
See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 22-10, at 898. In such a case the seller would be
in possession of a perfected security interest. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 939.
Under UCC § 9-113(b) the requirement that the secured party file to perfect is waived if the
buyer/debtor does not lawfully obtain possession. Id. at 939 n. 110.
174. If the seller's recovery is governed by article 2 standards, he should defeat the Bank-
ruptcy Act § 70(c) trustee. If the seller is deemed to be in possession of a perfected security
interest controlled by the priority rules of article 9, he should defeat the trustee if the interest
was perfected before the lien creditor acquired his lien. See supra note 152.
175. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 933-34, 938, 940-41. Jackson and Peters state
that:
The language of section 9-113 arguably accommodates the vicissitudes of the
reacquiring seller. It provides that Article 9 rules on validation, perfection, and
default do not apply "so long as the debtor does not have ... possession." If
"so long as" implies that the debtor's possession is reversible, then, upon reac-
quisition, the seller's Article 2 rights are not seriously compromised. Although
such a seller may have to take into account the interests of other parties that
arose while the buyer was in possession, his reacquisition is still to be distin-
guished from the retaking associated with ordinary Article 9 security interests.
Id. at 933-34 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). Thus, upon repossession, no security
agreement is required to make the security interest enforceable, no filing is needed to perfect it,
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buyer's possession without payment was deemed lawful.
c. The Preferred Resolution of UCC Cash Sale Priority Problems. Thus
far, the arguments for the UCC cash seller's priority over the lien creditor
and the Bankruptcy Act section 70(c) trustee have been mainly negative.
The primary concern of the preceding discussion has been to demonstrate
that the UCC cash seller cannot be subordinated to a lien creditor under
UCC sections 2-702(3) and 9-301(l)(b). What remains to be considered is
the proper means for determining priority between the cash seller and the
lien creditor. The authors contend that UCC section 2-403 provides the best
resolution of this question. The fact that section 2-403 is capable of handling
all important cash sale priority questions provides support for this
position. 176
UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) only apply as between buyer and
seller and do not control the cash seller's relations with third parties. 177
However, UCC section 2-403(1)178 subordinates the cash seller to a good
and the rights of the secured party upon the buyer's default are governed by article 2. The
seller would defeat the Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) trustee either under article 2, or as a perfected
secured party under article 9. Jackson and Peters, however, suggest that the seller should lose
to a lien creditor who obtains his lien while the buyer is in lawful possession of the goods, for at
this time the seller's interest would be neither perfected nor governed by article 2. Jackson &
Peters, supra note 1, at 938. Since the Bankruptcy Act § 70(c) trustee assumes the position of
a hypothetical lien creditor who obtained his lien on the date of bankruptcy, see supra notes
106-07 and accompanying text, the seller could lose to a trustee when the buyer was lawfully in
possession of the goods on the day of bankruptcy. Jackson and Peters also suggest that the
seller may lose his preferred position if he fails to reclaim promptly. See Jackson & Peters,
supra note 1, at 940-41. But see U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 3 (1978) (a secured party who wishes
to retain a security interest after the debtor lawfully obtains possession must comply fully with
article 9 and must ordinarily perfect by filing to protect himself against third parties); cf First
Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz. 263, 267-68, 645 P.2d 778, 782 (1982) (seller could not
recover against a secured party because he failed to complete a security agreement or to be in
possession of the collateral under UCC § 9-203(l)(a) at a time when the buyer had rights in the
collateral).
176. Cf Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 948: "While it is true that Article 2 has no
section denominated 'priorities,' section 2-403 contains a form of ordering for the cases within
its bounds that is indistinguishable from the ordering scheme we customarily consider a priori-
ties framework." (Footnote omitted).
177. U.C.C. § 2-507(2) (1978) states: "Where payment is due and demanded on the deliv-
ery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain or
dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due." U.C.C. § 2-511(3) (1978)
provides in relevant part that: "payment by check is conditional and is defeated as between the
parties by dishonor of the check on due presentment." Id. § 2-511 comment 4 declares: "Sub-
section (3) is concerned with the rights and obligations as between the parties to a sales trans-
action when payment is made by check. . . . The conditional character of the payment under
this section refers only to the effect of the transaction 'as between the parties' thereto . ... "
Cases routinely state that UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) only apply as between the parties.
Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1974).
178. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1978) provides in part that:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferer had or had
power to transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights
only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value. When goods
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faith purchaser for value 179 and refers to bad check sales and cash sales in
general while doing so.' 80 Since article 9 secured parties18" ' are routinely
held to be good faith purchasers for value,18 2 UCC section 2-403(1) provides
a basis for their triumph over the cash seller.
UCC section 2-403 does not directly resolve the cash seller/lien creditor
priority question.18 3 Section 2-403(4) directs us to article 9 for a solution to
the problem, but neither of the two relevant article 9 provisions mentioning
the lien creditor is very helpful. UCC section 9-301(3) fails to decide the
issue because that section is essentially definitional and merely recognizes the
trustee's lien creditor status under Bankruptcy Act section 70(c).184 UCC
section 9-301(1)(b), which subordinates an unperfected secured party to a
lien creditor, is inadequate because the UCC cash sale provisions do not
have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such
power even though ....
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale....
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are gov-
erned by the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Arti-
cle 6) and Documents of Title (Article 7).
Id. § 2-507(2) comment 3 implicitly refers to UCC § 2-403 when that comment provides:
Subsection (2) deals with the effect of a conditional delivery by the seller and
in such a situation makes the buyer's "right as against the seller" conditional
upon payment. These words are used as words of limitation to conform with the
policy set forth in the bona fide purchase sections of this Article.
Section 2-403 is the only article 2 provision plausibly identified as a bona fide purchase section.
179. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1288, 79 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1984).
180. The reclaiming credit seller under UCC § 2-702(2) is likewise subordinated to a good
faith purchaser for value under either UCC § 2-403(1) or UCC § 2-702(3).
181. The reasoning contained in infra note 182 and accompanying text should apply to
unperfected as well as perfected security interests. The cases in which a cash seller competes
with a holder of an unperfected security interest, however, generally consider whether the cash
sale reclamation right is a security interest. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Carbajal, 132 Ariz.
263, 645 P.2d 778, 782-83 (1982) (seller's right, while still a security interest, did not attach,
and seller thus defeated by unperfected secured party); Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado
Springs Nat'l Bank, 184 Colo. 166, 519 P.2d 354, 358-60 (1974) (secured party declared good
faith purchaser for value, seller's attempt to characterize right as security interest rejected, and
unperfected secured party wins because cash sale reclamation right not one of the interests
defeating an unperfected security interest in UCC § 9-301); Hardick v. Hill, 403 So. 2d 1125,
1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (cash seller defeats unperfected security interest and cash seller
first to attach).
182. Eg., Sorrels v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 597 F.2d 997, 1001 (5th Cir. 1979); Stowers
v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1242-44 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976); United States v. Wyoming Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d 1064, 1067-68 (10th Cir. 1974); see
Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 18-19; Mann & Phillips, supra note 3, at 386-87 (reason-
ing supporting secured party's good faith purchaser for value status).
183. Despite some confusing language in Stowers v. Mahon (In re Samuels & Co.), 526
F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), which might be read as assert-
ing a contrary proposition, the lien creditor is not a good faith purchaser for value. See Mann
& Phillips III, supra note 1, at 20-21; see also Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Wear (In re
PFA Farmers Mkt. Ass'n), 583 F.2d 992, 997-98 (8th Cir. 1978) (lien creditor is not good faith
purchaser for value under UCC § 2-403).
184. See supra notes 104, 118 and accompanying text.
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create a security interest. UCC section 1-103,185 however, allows recourse to
pre-UCC law. Before enactment of the UCC the cash seller defeated an at-
taching lien creditor. 186 As a result, the cash seller defeats a lien creditor
under the UCC 187 and also defeats a trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy
Act section 70(c).
UCC section 2-403's solution has two distinct advantages over the other
solutions provided by current case law. First, this solution produces certain
and uniform results. Our research has uncovered no common law cases in
which the lien creditor defeated an unpaid cash seller who had not waived
his rights. Second, if UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) embody the com-
mon law cash sale doctrine, as we believe they do, UCC section 2-403 re-
solves the priority problem in a way that is consistent with the common law
doctrines, and thus provides historical continuity as well.
2. The Cash Seller Under Bankruptcy Act Section 60. When the cash
seller reclaimed the goods within the four months preceding bankruptcy, he
ran the risk of having the repossession declared preferential under section 60
of the Bankruptcy Act.188 A preferential transfer was: (1) a transfer;
(2) made or suffered by the debtor; (3) of the debtor's property; (4) within
four months of bankruptcy; (5) to a creditor; (6) on account of an antecedent
debt; (7) while the debtor was insolvent; and (8) enabling the creditor to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class. 89 The trustee could avoid a preference if the creditor receiving it had,
at the time the transfer was made, reason to believe the debtor was
insolvent. 190
Arguing that the UCC cash seller's repossession following the buyer's fail-
ure to pay constituted a voidable preference if the repossession occurred
within four months of bankruptcy is not difficult. A repossession taking
place within that time was obviously a transfer within the Bankruptcy Act's
broad definition of that term,1 91 and while this transfer may not always have
been made by the debtor, the transfer certainly was at least suffered by that
party. Although in cash sales prior to the UCC doubt existed as to whether
185. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this
Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions."
186. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
187. Citizens Bank v. Taggart, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 324-26, 191 Cal. Rptr. 729, 733-35
(1983) (cash seller defeats lien creditor).
188. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(l) defined a preferential transfer as:
a transfer. . . of any of the property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a credi-
tor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor
while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will
be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class.
189. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 106, § 248, at 285.
190. Bankruptcy Act § 60(b).
191. See id. § 1(30). The seller, however, might be regarded as having reclaimed the goods
when he merely made a demand for them. See Potts v. Mand Carpet Mills (In re Bel Air
Carpets, Inc.), 452 F.2d 1210, 1211 (9th Cir. 1971).
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goods delivered but not paid for were the debtor's property, 19 2 the situation
was probably different under the UCC. 193 Since the cash seller was repos-
sessing to satisfy a debt created at the time the seller delivered the goods to
the buyer, the transfer was made to a creditor on account of an antecedent
debt. Ordinarily, the buyer was insolvent in such cases. 194 Since the cash
seller without a perfected security interest would typically have been a gen-
192. Our research has not disclosed any cases clearly dealing with the question of whether
a repossession following a cash buyer's failure to pay for the goods was a preference prior to
enactment of the UCC. The pre-UCC cash seller, however, was generally able to recover in
bankruptcy, see supra note 38 and accompanying text, and a reclamation before bankruptcy
was almost certainly not preferential before passage of the UCC. The basic reason for this
conclusion is that, since title to the goods only moved upon payment in a cash sale, see supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text, the nonpaying buyer lacked title to them. Thus, the
seller's repossession could not have been a transfer of the debtor's property because the
nonpaying buyer received no title in a cash sale. See In re Perpall, 256 F. 758, 761 (2d Cir.
1919) (decided outside the preference context). Also, courts commonly held that no title
passed to the trustee in a cash sale in which payment was not made and that Bankruptcy Act
§ 60's "property of the debtor" standard was tested with reference to whether the trustee
would have obtained title under Bankruptcy Act § 70(a). See 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 23,
60.07[2], at 791; 4A id. 70.19[5], at 242-44. When the defrauded credit seller repossessed the
goods, the reclamation was not preferential because the buyer acquired only a voidable title
and the transfer thus did not involve the property of the debtor. Fisher v. Shreve, Crump &
Low Co., 7 F.2d 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1925). Furthermore, the repossessing party also tri-
umphed over the Bankruptcy Act § 60 trustee in consignment and bailment cases. See Kemp-
Booth Co. v. Calvin, 84 F.2d 377, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1936); In re Wright-Dana Hardware Co.,
205 F. 335, 336 (N.D.N.Y. 1913), aff'd, 211 F. 908 (2d Cir. 1914). Finally, the seller's repos-
session under a conditional sales contract was not preferential. Finance & Guar. Co. v. Op-
penhimer, 276 U.S. 10, 12 (1928).
193. The UCC de-emphasizes the title concept. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
U.C.C. § 2-401 comment 1 (1978) states that:
This section . . . in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation
should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation de-
pends upon. . . location of "title" without further definition .... It is there-
fore necessary to state. . . when title passes under this Article in case the courts
deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the "private" law.
Assuming that the Bankruptcy Act qualified as a public regulation, this language might be
read as instructing the courts to consult UCC § 2-401's title passage rules in Bankruptcy Act
§ 60 cases. U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1978) states: "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to
the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to
the physical delivery of the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest .... " The
last sentence of UCC § 2-401(1) declares: "Subject to these provisions . . . title to goods
passes from the seller to the buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by
the parties." Among the provisions to which this rule is subject, however, is UCC § 2-401(1)'s
statement that "[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller... is limited in effect to a reserva-
tion of a security interest." Thus, if the cash sale is regarded as not involving any agreement
regarding the passage of title, title moves to the buyer when the seller delivers, and any subse-
quent repossesion would be a transfer of the debtor's property. If the cash sale is characterized
as involving an explicit agreement that title will not pass until payment of the price, such an
agreement would most likely be characterized as involving only the reservation of a security
interest. This characterization will not prevent title from passing in the normal fashion. See
U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1978). Of course, we do not view the UCC cash sale as coming within the
terms of UCC § 2-401(1). See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text.
194. Bankruptcy Act § 1(15) defined insolvency as a situation in which the aggregate of the
debtor's property was insufficient to pay his debts. The UCC definition of insolvency, how-
ever, is broader. See U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1978). This difference between definitions should be
of no concern unless the cash sale reclamation right is based on UCC § 2-702(2), which prem-
ises the right on the seller's discovery of the buyer's insolvency. This reading of the cash sale
reclamation right, however, is untenable. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
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eral creditor in bankruptcy, 19- and since such creditors usually do not re-
cover anything resembling the full amount of their debts, the transfer would
enable the reclaiming cash seller to fare better than general creditors. Fi-
nally, the reclamation ordinarily occurred in circumstances strongly sug-
gesting that the buyer was in financial difficulty, thus satisfying the
requirement that the creditor have reason to believe that the buyer is
insolvent.
Despite the surface plausibility of this argument, it is unlikely that a pre-
bankruptcy repossession by the UCC cash seller was preferential under
Bankruptcy Act section 60. The trustee's power to avoid the reclamation
depended on his ability to establish all the elements of a preference plus the
seller's reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's insolvency. The trustee's
position was only as strong as the weakest link in his argumentative chain,
and several weak links exist in the above argument. First, it was not obvious
that all reclamations by unpaid cash sellers would have been undertaken
with the requisite reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's insolvency. 196
Second, the contention that a repossession following the cash buyer's failure
to pay or the dishonor of the buyer's check was inevitably on account of an
antecedent debt is not completely convincing. 197 When a seller of goods had
extended credit, the buyer's subsequent payment obviously was for an ante-
cedent debt. 198 The buyer's contemporaneous payment for goods received in
a cash sale, on the other hand, was not for an antecedent debt. 199 When the
cash seller repossessed following the buyer's failure to pay or the dishonor of
the buyer's check, no way existed for him to repossess quickly enough to
avoid the reclamation's characterization as a transfer for a preexisting obli-
gation. Even in the stereotypical over-the-counter sale in which the seller
handed over the goods, the buyer refused payment, and the seller promptly
195. See Bankruptcy Act § 64 (establishing Bankruptcy Act debt priorities).
196. The seller's reclamation of the goods, without anything more, did not always provide
sufficient evidence for a finding of reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's insolvency. Com-
pare Brown v. Tru-Lite, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 800, 804-05 (W.D. La. 1975) (seizure of goods by
itself not necessarily enough to create finding of reasonable cause; each case must be consid-
ered on own facts), with Bossak & Co. v. Coxe, 285 F. 147, 148-49 (5th Cir. 1922) (recovery of
goods then worth only fifty percent of their sale price sufficient to establish reasonable cause).
Also, the courts seemed in general agreement that the mere receipt of a bad check was not
itself sufficient to create a reasonable belief finding. See, e.g., C.A. Swanson & Sons Poultry
Co. v. Wylie, 237 F.2d 16, 18 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1956) (not-sufficient-funds check one factor
among many to consider); Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116 F. Supp. 455, 462 (W.D. Ark. 1953)
(not-sufficient-funds check not conclusive; courts must consider other circumstances); Robie v.
Myers Equip. Co., 114 F. Supp. 177, 182 (D. Minn. 1953) (dishonored check plus subsequent
offer of post-dated check sufficient to create finding of reasonable cause); Conners v. Bucksport
Nat'l Bank, 214 F. 847, 849-50 (D. Me.) (bad check plus other information enough for finding
of reasonable cause), afl'd mem., 216 F. 990 (1st Cir. 1914).
197. Peck v. Augustin Bros., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1979) ("[r]eclamation is
not a voidable preference because the title is voidable; thus, there is no transfer on account of
an antecedent debt").
198. Stock Clearing Corp. v. Weis See. Inc. (In re Weis Sec. Inc.), 542 F.2d 840, 843 (2d
Cir. 1976).
199. See id. A transaction originating as a cash sale could be converted into a transaction
for credit, however, if the seller in fact extended credit. In such cases, a subsequent transfer in
payment of the debt was for antecedent debt and could be preferential. Nat'l City Bank v.
Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50, 58 (1913).
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reclaimed the transferred property, the reclamation presumably occurred af-
ter creation of the debt. With reference to Bankruptcy Act section 60's aim
of protecting creditors against depletion of the estate by preferential trans-
fers to other creditors, this situation was indistinguishable from the situation
in which the buyer simply paid cash for the goods. Thus, in cases in which
the seller reclaimed with reasonable promptness, the better course was to
regard repossession as relating back to the time the debt arose2°° and to treat
such a reclamation as nonpreferential.
Another possible argument was that the UCC cash seller's repossession of
the goods did not diminish the bankrupt's estate.20 1 In a normal cash sale in
which the transfer of the goods and the transfer of the price are substantially
simultaneous, the buyer's payment of the price was nonpreferential. 20 2 This
result was based at least in part on the argument that such an exchange did
not diminish the estate203 because the goods and their price were of approxi-
mately equal value. The cash seller's repossession of delivered goods follow-
ing the buyer's failure to pay was therefore also not preferential, since the
underlying transaction was identical and the net effect on the estate was
quite similar to the normal cash sale. Courts generally held that when the
owner of property that had been stolen, misappropriated, converted, or
fraudulently obtained stood on his right of ownership and re-took the prop-
erty, no diminution of the estate and no preference occurred.
2°4
Whether the UCC cash seller was even a creditor under Bankruptcy Act
section 60 was also doubtful. When the bankrupt debtor had stolen, misap-
propriated, converted, or fraudulently obtained property belonging to an-
other, that party was not a creditor if he stood on his rights as owner and
demanded return of the property or, in fraud cases, moved to rescind the
transaction.20 5 This doctrine clearly applied when the buyer defrauded the
200. One court considering the credit seller's fate under Bankruptcy Act §§ 64 and 67(c)
seems to have taken this view.
[U]nder section 2-702(2) receipt of goods on credit while insolvent is deemed a
fraud on the creditor rendering the sale voidable. The sale thus is defective from
its inception. Clearly no new security has been given for an antecedent debt; the
"lien," if it is conceived as such, attached at the instant the debt was created.
Because no transfer is made on account of an antecedent debt, section 60 could
never be applicable.
Alfred M. Lewis, Inc. v. Holzman (In re Telemart Enters.), 524 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 469 (1976).
201. 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 23, 60.20, at 856-58 (requirement of depletion of bank-
rupt's estate implicit in nature of preference).
202. See id. 60.19, at 847-49, T 60.23, at 872-73. Also, the result is no different if the
seller waits a reasonable length of time before cashing the check. J. MACLACHLAN, supra note
106, § 255, at 292.
203. See 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 23, 60.20, at 861-62; 60.23, at 872-73.
204. Id. $ 60.24, at 878. No obvious reason existed not to extend this doctrine to cover the
cash sale. In fact, the failure to pay for the goods in a cash sale has been said to involve a type
of fraud. See supra note 31. When the owner accepted different property as a substitute for
the property wrongly taken or when the property originally taken had so far lost its identity as
not to be traceable, however, the courts ruled that diminution of the estate and a preference
occurred. 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 23, $ 60.24, at 878.
205. 3 W. COLLIER, supra note 23, 60.18, at 841, 843-44. This presumption that the
seller was an owner and not a creditor was not true, however, when the owner elected to treat
the bankrupt party as a debtor. Id. at 841-43. Moreover, the bankrupt's payment or giving of
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seller, 20 6 and should have protected the reclaiming cash seller 20 7 since bad
check situations can be characterized as involving fraudulent conduct. 208
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the UCC cash seller's ability to de-
feat the trustee in a reclamation proceeding occurring after the bankruptcy
petition209 should have worked to the seller's advantage when the trustee
challenged a pre-bankruptcy repossession as preferential. Were the situation
otherwise, the seller who acted promptly to assert his rights would have been
penalized by having his reclamation declared a voidable preference, while
the more dilatory seller would have emerged victorious.
210
III. THE CASH SELLER UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Congress's passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act 2 1 1 in 1978 changed the
position of the reclaiming seller dramatically. The provision effecting this
change is Bankruptcy Code section 546(c), 212 which purports to end the
prior confusion regarding the reclaiming seller's rights in bankruptcy by al-
lowing certain sellers to defeat the trustee once they have met the section's
procedural requirements. Although Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) clearly
was intended to embrace the UCC section 2-702(2) credit seller, its applica-
tion to the cash seller is dubious. After briefly considering Bankruptcy Code
section 546(c)'s provisions, this section of the Article argues that section
546(c) does not cover the cash seller. The Article urges instead that a trustee
seeking to defeat the cash seller must proceed under the successors to Bank-
security was preferential when the property sold could not be traced or identified; and the
return of goods or funds other than those wrongfully obtained by the bankrupt was also prefer-
ential. Id. at 844-45.
206. Fisher v. Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159, 160 (D. Mass. 1925); Kamberg v.
Springfield Nat'l Bank, 293 Mass. 24, 199 N.E. 339, 341 (1935).
207. Peck v. Augustin Bros., 203 Neb. 574, 279 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1979). J. MACLACH-
LAN, supra note 106, at 292 (footnotes omitted) states:
The fact should be observed that modem business practice regards checks as
cash. Accordingly, the holder of a check given for a cash sale by him does not
become a creditor merely by waiting a week or two to cash it, and even if the
check is returned insufficient funds, he may not be treated as a creditor, at least
the first time he has the experience with a particular debtor, when there is noth-
ing else to put him on enquiry. But it has been held that taking property other
than the property sold in satisfaction of a bad check is an election to treat the
buyer as a debtor.
208. See supra note 31.
209. We are referring to the UCC cash seller's ability to defeat the trustee under Bank-
ruptcy Act §§ 64, 67(c), and 70(c).
210. In recognition of this anomaly one commentator has concluded that "[i]t is never
preferential for the debtor to do before bankruptcy what the trustee . . . can be compelled to
do after bankruptcy." J. MACLACHLAN, supra note 106, § 256, at 294. Robert Braucher has
come to the same conclusion:
If goods held by a fraudulent buyer are subject to reclamation from his trustee in
bankruptcy [i.e., are recoverable in an action initiated after the bankruptcy peti-
tion], a return or retaking of the goods shortly before bankruptcy should not be
a preference voidable by the trustee, even though the other elements of a voida-
ble preference are present, since there is no diminution of the assets of the estate.
Braucher, supra note 1, at 1285.
211. See supra note 4.
212. Bankruptcy Code § 546(c).
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ruptcy Act sections 70(c) and 60213 and that even then the cash seller should
ordinarily defeat the trustee.
A. Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c)
In relevant part, section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code provides:
[T]he rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544(a), 545, 547,
and 549 of this title are subject to any statutory or common-law right of
a seller of goods that has sold goods to the debtor, in the ordinary
course of such seller's business, to reclaim such goods if the debtor has
received such goods while insolvent, but-
(1) such a seller may not reclaim any such goods unless such seller
demands in writing reclamation of such goods before ten days after re-
ceipt of such goods by the debtor; and
(2) the court may deny reclamation to a seller with such a right of
reclamation that has made such a demand only if the court-
(A) grants the claim of such a seller priority . . . or
(B) secures such claim by a lien. 2 14
The section clearly recognizes certain state law reclamation rights, including
the right provided in UCC section 2-702(2),215 and protects the rights
against trustees utilizing the successors to Bankruptcy Act sections 70(c),
67c, and 60. Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) also seems to incorporate
common law fraud reclamation rights. 2 16 In all situations governed by
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) the goods to be reclaimed must have been
sold in the ordinary course of the seller's business, which should exclude
213. See generally infra notes 269-91 and accompanying text.
214. Bankruptcy Code § 546(c). The 1984 amendments, see supra note 4, do not appear to
change the substance of the section. Bankruptcy Code §§ 544(a), 545, and 547 are the succes-
sors to Bankruptcy Act §§ 70(c), 67c, and 60, respectively. Bankruptcy Code § 549 involves
post-petition transactions.
215. "The purpose of the provision is to recognize, in part, the validity of Section 2-702 of
the Uniform Commercial Code .... " S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 86-87 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as 1978 SENATE REPORT]; H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 371-72
(1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 HOUSE REPORT]. The UCC § 2-702(2) seller, however, may
not always be within Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s terms. The UCC definition of insolvency is
broader than that contained in the Bankruptcy Code. Compare U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1978)
with Bankruptcy Code § 101(26). Presumably, the Bankruptcy Code definition controls and,
in cases in which the buyer is insolvent in the UCC sense alone, Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)
should not apply. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 5, 546.04[2], at 546-12 to -13.
216. See Crown Quilt Corp. v. HRT Indus., Inc. (In re HRT Indus., Inc.), 29 Bankr. 861,
862-64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (but reclamation fails because no ten-day written demand and
Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) is exclusive vehicle for reclaiming seller); Ecolotec, Inc. v.
Deephouse Equip. Co. (In re Deephouse Equip. Co.), 22 Bankr. 255, 257-59 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1982) (Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) is exclusive remedy to seller alleging common law fraud);
McCain Foods, Inc. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Co. (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 14
Bankr. 462, 463-64, 466-68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s
recognition of common law rights); In re Original Auto Parts Distrib., Inc., 9 Bankr. 469, 471
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (explicit recognition that, despite UCC § 2-702(2), Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c) permits assertion of common law reclamation right in bankruptcy). Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c) should override UCC § 2-702(2)'s exclusivity language on federal supremacy grounds.
Bankruptcy Code § 546(c), however, does not include the UCC § 2-705 right of stoppage in
transit. See National Sugar Ref. Co. v. C. Czarnikow, Inc. (In re National Sugar Ref. Co.), 27




bulk sales, sales by a nonmerchant, and sales by a merchant that do not
involve his basic line of business.
The protection Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) affords covered sellers,
however, is limited by the requirement that the seller make a written de-
mand for the return of the goods before ten days after the buyer's receipt of
the goods. One court held that the written demand must explicitly state that
the seller is asserting the right to reclaim and that a state court suit seeking
damages and injunctive relief, but not reclamation, is inadequate to satisfy
the demand requirement. 217 Another court held that a letter and the initia-
tion of civil litigation seeking return of the goods will satisfy the demand
requirement. 218 Concerning the ten-day period itself, one court concluded
that the first day is the day after delivery, and that the period includes the
tenth day after delivery.219 The same court declared that if the last day of
the period is a Sunday, the period expands to embrace the end of the follow-
ing day.220 The date of delivery, according to two courts, is the day the
buyer receives actual physical possession of the goods.221 One of these
courts also held that the demand must only be dispatched, not received,
within the ten-day period. 222
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s ten-day written demand requirement
presents a fairly obvious problem concerning the fate of sellers who are
within that section's coverage and who possess valid state law reclamation
rights, but who fail to satisfy the written demand requirement. This problem
arises when, for instance, the reclaiming credit seller makes an oral demand
sufficient to satisfy UCC section 2-702(2) but not Bankruptcy Code section
546(c), 223 or when such a seller attempts to rely on the written misrepresen-
tation exception to UCC section 2-702(2)'s ten-day demand limitation.224 In
such cases, Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) is the seller's exclusive route for
reclaiming the goods in bankruptcy, and is not a nonexclusive safe harbor
allowing the seller who fails to satisfy the written demand requirement to
217. Montello Oil Corp. v. Main Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Main Motor Oil, Inc.), 740 F.2d
220, 224 (3d Cir. 1984).
218. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators,
Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 922 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
219. Action Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enters., Inc. (In re Dixie Enters., Inc.), 22 Bankr. 855,
857-58 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
220. Id. at 858.
221. Montello Oil Corp. v. Marin Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Main Motor Oil, Inc.), 740 F.2d
220, 224-26 (3d Cir. 1984); Aventura Sportswear, Ltd. v. Maloney Enters., Inc. (In re Maloney
Enters., Inc.), 37 Bankr. 290, 292 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1983).
222. Montello Oil Corp. v. Main Motor Oil, Inc. (In re Main Motor Oil, Inc.), 740 F.2d
220, 226-29 (3d Cir. 1984). Also, written notice given before the buyer's receipt of the goods
will satisfy Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s demand requirement. Continental Coal Sales Corp. v.
Alla-Ohio Valley Coals, Inc. (In re Alla-Ohio Valley Coals, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 336, 339-40(Bankr. D.D.C. 1982).
223. See Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro Corp.), 20 Bankr. 241, 242-43(Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); Bojalad & Co. v. Holiday Meat Packing, Inc. (In re Holiday Meat
Packing, Inc.), 30 Bankr. 737, 741 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1983); United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re
A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14 Bankr. 27, 28-29 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980).
224. See, e.g., Ateco Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.) 18 Bankr.
917, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
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proceed against the trustee as under prior bankruptcy law.2 2 5 Sellers who
are covered by Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) and who fail to make the
ten-day written demand have no further recourse against the trustee and
cannot reclaim the goods in bankruptcy.
Even the seller who satisfies Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s require-
ments will not inevitably recover the goods or their value. Such sellers re-
main subordinate to parties capable of defeating the reclaiming seller under
state law.2 2 6 Also, the court may instead grant priority to the seller's claim
as an administrative expense 227 or secure his claim by a lien 228 in lieu of
allowing reclamation. It has been held that the Bankruptcy Code section
225. Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro Corp.), 20 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr.
1st Cir. 1982) (cash sale); Roberts v. L.T.S., Inc. (In re L.T.S., Inc.), 32 Bankr. 907, 908-10
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1983); Crown Quilt Corp. v. HRT Indus., Inc. (In re HRT Indus., Inc.), 29
Bankr. 861, 863-65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Kentucky Flush Door Corp., 28 Bankr. 808,
810 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 19.83); Continental Coal Sales Corp. v. Alla-Ohio Valley Coals, Inc. (In
re Alla-Ohio Valley Coals, Inc.), 22 Bankr. 336, 339 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982) (possible dictum);
Ecolotec, Inc. v. Deephouse Equip. Co. (In re Deephouse Equip. Co.), 22 Bankr. 255, 258-59
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1982); Ateco Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 18
Bankr. 917, 919 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) (court doubted, but did not decide, whether written
misrepresentation occurred); B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract Interi-
ors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 670, 671, 672-76 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); In re Original Auto Parts
Distribs., Inc., 9 Bankr. 469, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Montello Oil Corp. v.
Main Motor Oil, Inc., 30 Bankr. 827, 829-31 (D.N.J. 1983) (affirming bankruptcy court deci-
sion that Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) exclusive), rev'd on other grounds, 740 F.2d 220 (3d Cir.
1984). Coming to the same practical conclusion are those courts holding that, in order to
recover the goods in bankruptcy, sellers covered by Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) must comply
with that section's ten-day written demand requirement. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 921-22 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1983) (cash and credit sales); American Druggists' Ins. Co. v. Jeanes Mech. Contractors,
Inc. (In re Jeanes Mech. Contractors, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 657, 658-59 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983);
Ateco Equip., Inc. v. Columbia Gas (In re Ateco Equip., Inc.), 18 Bankr. 917, 920 (Bankr.
W.D. Pa. 1982). One court, however, held that Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) is not the re-
claiming seller's exclusive bankruptcy provision and that the seller failing to comply with
Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s demand requirement can confront the trustee under the trustee's
other avoiding powers. See United Beef Packers v. Lee (In re A.G.S. Food Sys., Inc.), 14
Bankr. 27, 28-29 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1980). We previously took the position that Bankruptcy
Code § 546(c) should be read as nonexclusive and that the seller failing to comply with that
section is not precluded from further confronting the trustee. See Mann & Phillips III, supra
note 1, at 51-56; Mann & Phillips, supra note 5, at 264-68. Our view on this matter remains
unchanged, but the weight of authority is obviously to the contrary. Most of this authority,
however, consists of bankruptcy court decisions.
226. "As under nonbankruptcy law, the right is subject to any superior rights of other
creditors." 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 215, at 86-87; 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note
215, at 371-72; see also Action Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Enters., Inc. (In re Dixie Enters., Inc.), 22
Bankr. 855, 859 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (seller subordinate to good faith purchasers and
secured parties in bankruptcy); 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, 546.04[2], at 546-13 to -14
(seller subordinate).
227. See Bankruptcy Code §§ 503(b), 507(a)(1). For a case awarding such a priority, see
McCain Foods, Inc. v. Flagstaff Foodservice Co. (In re Flagstaff Foodservice Corp.), 14
Bankr. 462, 463, 469 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (seller gets administrative claim priority but only
to extent of portion of goods in debtor's possession on day of demand and day of petition,
which were the same day).
228. See Western Farmers Ass'n v. Ciba Geigy (In re Western Farmers Ass'n), 6 Bankr.
432, 436 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1980) (seller obtains lien subordinate to secured party's rights
but having priority over administrative claims).
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546(c) seller has no right to the proceeds of the goods he seeks to reclaim, 229
but this obviously does not preclude the seller who has been awarded an
administrative priority or a lien from participating in the division of the es-
tate as dictated by the terms of such an award.
B. Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c) and the Cash Seller
Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code should not be read as including the
cash seller.230 The section's literal terms compel this conclusion, and legisla-
tive history and judicial interpretations that might suggest a contrary read-
ing of the section do not seriously undermine this position.231
1. The Literal Meaning of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c). Bankruptcy
Code section 546(c) only recognizes and protects reclamation rights pre-
mised on the debtor's receipt of the goods while insolvent. 232 UCC sections
2-507(2) and 2-511(3) clearly do not create such rights. Neither section de-
pends for its operation upon the buyer's receipt of the goods while insol-
vent.233 UCC section 2-702, by contrast, is premised on the buyer's receipt
of the goods while insolvent. The weight of authority, however, has con-
cluded that the UCC cash sale reclamation right is inherent to UCC sections
229. Dopps v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 31 Bankr. 667, 669-70 (Bankr.
D. Ore. 1982).
230. This conclusion is admittedly contrary to the position we have taken in two previous
articles. See Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 49-51; Mann & Phillips, supra note 5, at
263-64. The reason for our shift is the considerable number of decisions holding that Bank-
ruptcy Code § 546(c) is the reclaiming seller's exclusive remedy in bankruptcy. Our previous
inclusion of the cash seller within Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) was premised on the opposite
assumption. See Mann & Phillips III, supra note 1, at 50; Mann & Phillips, supra note 5, at
264.
231. This conclusion is also supported by certain general policy considerations. See infra
notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
232. See supra text accompanying note 214. Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) might, however, be
given another literal reading, one that would include the cash seller. Rather than recognizing
and incorporating statutory or common law reclamation rights themselves contingent on the
buyer's receipt of goods while insolvent, the section might be read as recognizing and incorpo-
rating any statutory or common law reclamation right, with the proviso that, for the right to
be effective against the trustee, the debtor/buyer must in fact have received the goods while
insolvent. For instance, a cash sale reclamation right based on UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
should qualify as a statutory reclamation right arising in the ordinary course of the seller's
business. Under this view of Bankruptcy Code § 546(c), the cash seller would defeat a trustee
if the buyer received the goods while insolvent and the seller made a timely written demand.
This alternative reading of Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) has little or nothing to recommend it.
First, Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) largely tracks UCC § 2-702(2)'s language, and was obviously
drafted with that section in mind. Second, the "if the debtor has received such goods while
insolvent" language is not set off or distinguished from the remainder of Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c)'s main paragraph in any way. The ten-day written demand requirement, on the other
hand, is clearly separated from the body of that paragraph. Most importantly, this alternative
reading of Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) sweeps too broadly. A seller with a purchase money
security interest in goods sold to the buyer has a right to repossess the goods upon the buyer's
default. U.C.C. § 9-503 (1978). This right should qualify as a statutory reclamation right, but
no one argues that Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) includes article 9 secured parties. To suggest
that a perfected secured party must meet Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s ten-day written demand
requirement, or else lose all rights to the goods, is ludicrous.
233. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
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2-507(2) and 2-511(3), and is not based on UCC section 2-702(2).234 Even
assuming arguendo that the UCC cash sale reclamation right does derive
from UCC section 2-702(2), the right still should not depend on the buyer's
receipt of the goods while insolvent. Even on this assumption section 2-
702(2) merely provides the cash seller with a right to reclaim, but does not
state the conditions under which that right arises. Whatever the source of
the cash sale reclamation right, that right still depends on the buyer's failure
to make the payment due or the dishonor of the buyer's check, and not on
the buyer's receipt of the goods while insolvent.235 To reason otherwise is to
make UCC section 2-702(2)'s requirements applicable in the cash sale con-
text, to blur the distinction between cash and credit sales, and to render
UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) superfluous.
2. The Extrinsic Evidence of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c)'s Mean-
ing. The legislative history accompanying Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)
is scanty, ambiguous, and conflicting. The history provides little insight into
whether Congress intended to include the cash seller within the scope of that
section, or even whether including the cash seller within the section's scope
furthers Congress's purpose in enacting that section.2 36 Section 546 of the
House and Senate bills that formed the basis for the Bankruptcy Reform Act
spoke of recovery rights arising "if the debtor has received goods on credit
234. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
235. Perhaps, however, UCC § 2-702(2) can be conjoined with UCC § 2-507(2) and § 2-
511(3) in such a way as to premise the cash sale reclamation right on all the requirements
stated by each relevant provision. For example, the seller's recovery in a bad check case might
depend upon the dishonor of the buyer's check (UCC § 2-511(3)), plus the buyer's receipt of
the goods while insolvent (UCC § 2-702(2)). Admittedly, a few decisions exist that can be read
as doing this. See Robert Weed Plywood Corp. v. Downs (In re Richardson Homes Corp.), 18
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 384, 386 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1975); In re Kirk Kabinets, Inc., 15 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 746, 748-49 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1974). If the UCC sections should be conjoined, the
cash sale reclamation right seems to be partly based on the buyer's receipt of the goods while
insolvent, and Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) would apply.
Even if the relevance of UCC § 2-702(2) to UCC § 2-507(2) and § 2-511(3) is conceded,
however, this particular way of conjoining the sections is ludicrous. First, this reading ignores
the fact that UCC § 2-702(2)'s "receipt of the goods while insolvent" language is rooted in pre-
UCC fraud doctrines to which the antecedents of UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) have little or
no relation. See supra notes 11-12, 20-27, 43-47 and accompanying text. As a result, the
practical effect of such a reading is to blur the distinction between the cash sale reclamation
right and the qualified reenactment of the credit seller's right of rescission for fraud contained
in UCC § 2-702(2). Second, and more importantly, combining UCC §§ 2-507(2) and 2-511(3)
with UCC § 2-702(2) to produce a hybrid cash sale reclamation right dependent in part on the
buyer's receipt of the goods while insolvent ignores the fact that the UCC § 2-702(2) right is
based on the buyer's receipt of the goods "on credit while insolvent." U.C.C. § 2-702(2)
(1978). If the UCC § 2-702(2) reclamation right is to apply to cash sales, the conditions giving
rise to that right should also apply to cash sales, but one of these conditions is the existence of
a credit sale, and this condition clearly cannot control the cash seller.
236. The line between legislative intent and purpose is often indistinct. R. DICKERSON,
THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 87-88 (1975). When using legislative
intent we refer to the meaning that a representative assembly attached to words used in a
statute. On the other hand, when using legislative purpose we mean the overall aim, end, or




while insolvent. '237 The final version of section 546(c), of course, did not
contain the words "on credit." This permits the inference that Congress
meant to include cash sales within Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s pur-
view. Reinforcing this inference are the statements of two legislators promi-
nent in the formulation and enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, each of
whom declared that section 546(c) applied to both credit and cash sales.238
On the other hand, the only clear statement of the legislative purpose under-
lying Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) states that the purpose of that section
was to recognize the validity of UCC section 2-702,239 which is consistent
with an aim not to include the cash seller within Bankruptcy Code section
546(c).
Thus, we are left with a clash between Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s
language, which clearly excludes the cash seller, and an ambiguous legisla-
tive history. The traditional way to resolve conflicts of this sort is to employ
the strict version of the plain meaning rule, which counsels courts to follow
the literal language of the statute and to ignore such extrinsic interpretative
aids as legislative history when the statutory language is clear unless such an
interpretation would produce absurd or impracticable results.24° Bank-
ruptcy Code section 546(c) clearly recognizes and protects only those seller
reclamation rights premised on the debtor's receipt of the goods while insol-
vent, and the UCC cash sale reclamation right is just as clearly not so pre-
mised. Moreover, reading Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) as excluding the
cash seller does not produce absurd or impracticable results, but merely
means that the reclaiming cash seller will confront the trustee in much the
237. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b), 123 CONG. REC. 22, 183 (1977); S. 2266,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b), 123 CONG. REC. 36,091 (1977).
238. 124 CONG. REC. 34,000 (1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); 124 CONG. REC. 32,400
(1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
239. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 215, at 86-87; 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note
215, at 371-72. An early draft provision, which eventually became Bankruptcy Code § 546(c),
provided for a right to reclaim when the "[d]ebtor received the property on credit orpayment
by draft which was subsequently dishonored." Hearings on S.235 and S.236 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Improvement of Judicial Machinery ofthe Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., Part I, at 121 (1975) (emphasis added); see also Weintraub & Edelman, supra note 1,
at 1165-66 (describing this provision and its context). The italicized language was subse-
quently dropped, suggesting that the reclamation provision was no longer to cover the bad
check seller. Accordingly, the later deletion of the words "on credit" may simply have been
intended to remove surplusage in the statutory language, which by then clearly referred only to
UCC § 2-702(2) and common law fraud.
240. On the continued recognition of the plain meaning rule, see 2A D. SANDS, SUTHER-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01, at 48 (1972). One classic formu-
lation of the plain meaning rule states that "[w]here the language is plain and admits of no
more than one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
"[W]hen words are free from doubt," the same source continues, "they must be taken as the
final expression of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by
considerations drawn from . . . any extraneous source"; such plain language, it concludes, "is
the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent" unless it leads to "absurd or wholly imprac-
ticable consequences." Id. at 490-91. Much the same viewpoint is expressed by the common
statement that the role of the various interpretative aids is "only to resolve ambiguity and




same fashion as under prior bankruptcy law. Thus, adherence to a strict
version of the plain meaning rule makes the indicated legislative history ir-
relevant and compels the cash seller's exclusion from Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 546(c).
Today, however, the strict version of the plain meaning rule may no
longer enjoy wide acceptance. 24 1 If so, then balancing the claims of clear
statutory language against those of extrinsic evidence when the two conflict
becomes necessary. 24 2 Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s literal language
clearly excludes the cash seller, but the legislative history suggesting an in-
tent to the contrary is less compelling. Congress's deletion of the "on
credit" language from the original bill may suggest an intent to include the
cash seller,243 but our review of the legislative history to Bankruptcy Code
section 546(c) does not reveal any explanation for the elimination of the ref-
erence to credit sales. The deletion could be read as merely removing sur-
plusage in statutory language that clearly referred only to UCC section 2-
702(2) and common law fraud. If Congress did intend to include the cash
seller by deleting the words "on credit," it did a rather incomplete job of
effectuating that intent. Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s reference to recla-
mation rights premised on the debtor's insolvency, which clearly excluded
the UCC cash seller, was left untouched.
Statements by the committeeman in charge of a particular bill are consid-
ered highly persuasive evidence of the legislative intent, 24 4 but such state-
ments are not conclusive and cannot override clear statutory language to the
contrary. 245 Thus, the two statements that the cash seller is covered by
241. See 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 46.07; R. DICKERSON, supra note 236, at 230
(noting lack of an agreed upon content to plain meaning rule, especially as regards what plain
meaning rule excludes from the court's consideration).
242. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 236, at 232-33 (plain meaning rule only creates pre-
sumption that legislature meant what it said, and this presumption can be overcome by strong
enough evidence of absurdity, inequity, or unreasonableness). 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240,
§ 46.07, at 65, however, seems to take the view that, when text and history conflict, the text
should give way. "[I]t is clear that if the literal import of the text of an act is not consistent
with the legislative meaning or intent, or such interpretation leads to absurd results, the words
of the statute will be modified by the intention of the legislature." Id. (footnote omitted).
"The intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read so as to conform
to the spirit of the act." Id. However, this can only occur when "the words are sufficiently
flexible" to accommodate the legislature's apparent intention. Id. But even assuming over-
whelming extrinsic evidence of a congressional intention to include the cash seller in Bank-
ruptcy Code § 546(c), that section's language is not flexible enough to include the cash seller
and cannot be read in such a way as to accommodate Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s presumed
spirit. Moreover, the legislative history indicating an intent to include the cash seller is less
than overwhelming, and we do not read the quoted language as stating that any extrinsic
indication of an intent contrary to the plain meaning of the text, no matter how weak, should
invariably triumph over clear statutory language.
243. See 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 48.18, at 224-25 (stressing the need for caution in
using legislature's action on amendments). Some authority also exists for the proposition that
amendments should not be resorted to when the language of the statute is clear and unambigu-
ous. See E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 383-84 (1940).
244. See 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 48.14, at 220.
245. "Statements by the committeeman in charge of a bill are not, however, given effect to
override a clear and unambiguous meaning conveyed by the language of the statute." Id.
§ 48.14, at 220 (footnote omitted). A similar statement is made with respect to the committee
reports to which such statements are analogized. Id. § 48.06, at 203.
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Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) seem unable to prevail over the statute's
plain meaning. And, as has been noted, if Congress's intent was to include
the cash seller within Bankruptcy Code section 546(c), Congress used lan-
guage incredibly unsuited to the attainment of that end.
3. Judicial Interpretations of Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c). For all the
reasons discussed above, we believe that Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s
plain language excludes the cash seller and that the legislative history sug-
gesting a contrary interpretation should be ignored or accorded less weight
than the statutory language. Subsequent judicial interpretations of statutory
language, however, can be an important tool for ascertaining a statute's
meaning, 246 and two courts have held that Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)
includes cash sellers. 247 In one of these decisions a bankruptcy panel for the
First Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Bankruptcy Code section
546(c) included cash transactions. 248 The panel failed to find any express or
implied intent to limit the section's applicability to credit sales.249 It noted
that the section's legislative history supports its view. 250 The panel also read
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) as the seller's exclusive remedy, and since
the seller had failed to make a written demand within ten days, the seller was
not entitled to reclaim the goods. 25' The panel did not focus on the fact that
a literal reading of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) excludes the cash
seller.252 Instead, it described the scope and requirements of Bankruptcy
Code section 546(c) as "clear and unambiguous. '253
The second court holding that the cash seller is subject to Bankruptcy
Code section 546(c) proceeded somewhat differently. Confronted with a
mass of reclaiming cash and credit sellers, the court concluded, without any
explanation, that all sellers should be treated similarly. 254 Ignoring the nu-
merous decisions holding that the cash sale reclamation right is inherent to
UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3) and the many reasons why UCC section
246. See E. CRAWFORD, supra note 243, §§ 218, 224.
247. Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro Corp.), 10 Bankr. 767, 769 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1981), aft'd, 20 Bankr. 241 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 917 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1983).
248. Plastic Distrib. Corp. v. Koro Corp. (In re Koro Corp.), 20 Bankr. 241, 243 (Bankr.
1st Cir. 1982).
249. Id. at 243 n.3. The panel noted the lack of reference to the cash seller in the 1978
SENATE REPORT and 1977 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 259, but concluded that these sources
said nothing to indicate that the cash seller was excluded from Bankruptcy Code § 546(c).
250. 20 Bankr. at 243 n.3.
251. Id. at 243.
252. The panel also made no reference to Szabo v. Vinton Motors, Inc., 630 F.2d 1, 3 (1st
Cir. 1980), which held that the cash sale reclamation right is inherent to UCC §§ 2-507(2) and
2-511(3).
253. 20 Bankr. at 242. The panel paraphrased Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) as follows:
"[a]ny common law or statutory right to reclaim goods sold in the ordinary course of business
is contingent upon (the seller) making a written demand within ten days of the debtor's receipt
of the goods." Id. at 243.
254. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators), 32
Bankr. 912, 917 (W.D. Ky. 1983).
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2-702(2) cannot govern the cash seller, 255 the court proceeded to use UCC
section 2-702(2) to assess the rights of both the cash and the credit sellers.
Specifically, it made UCC section 2-702(2)'s ten-day demand, insolvent
buyer, and written misrepresentation requirements applicable to all these dif-
ferent sellers.2 56 The court then imposed Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s
ten-day written demand limitation on all the sellers.257 The few sellers sur-
viving these various hurdles were then held subordinate to a good faith pur-
chaser 258 under UCC section 2-702(3).259
There is little reason to give these two decisions much weight in the inter-
pretation of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c), 260 although their claim to con-
sideration is bolstered by the fact that they occurred fairly close to the time
of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s enactment. 261 Interpretative stability,
it has been argued, requires that once a court has made a decisive interpreta-
tion of legislative intent, other courts should follow that direction and con-
strue the statute as the prior court did.2 6 2 In addition, legislative silence in
the face of a particular interpretation is said to be evidence that the legisla-
ture intended to enact that interpretation.263 In reality, however, the courts
have not followed prior judicial interpretations in a mechanical fashion. To
become truly authoritative, an interpretation must be both widely ac-
cepted 264 and of long duration. 265 Here, only two decisions holding that
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) includes the cash seller exist, and both deci-
sions are relatively recent. The authoritativeness of the court from which
the decision emanates is another factor to consider in assessing the weight to
give to a prior interpretation. 266 In the present situation, the two pertinent
cases were decided by a bankruptcy court and an appellate bankruptcy
panel, each of whose decisions can be appealed. 267 Moreover, the argument
that legislative silence in the face of an interpretation implies tacit enactment
of that interpretation has frequently been criticized, and is especially unrelia-
ble when no evidence that the legislature was aware of the interpretation
exists.268 Here, there is no reason to think that Congress has paid any atten-
255. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
256. 32 Bankr. at 921.
257. Id. at 921-22. Presumably, the court did so because UCC § 2-702(2) clearly is within
Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s purview.
258. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
259. 32 Bankr. at 918-23. For our objections to the practice of using UCC § 2-702(3) to
govern cash sale priorities, see supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
260. Unreasonable and clearly erroneous constructions of statutes are not to be followed.
2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 49.14, at 235.
261. See id., § 49.08, at 255.
262. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 32 (paperback ed. 1949).
263. See 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 49.10.
264. See E. CRAWFORD, supra note 243, at 390; 2A D. SANDS, supra note 295, § 49.04, at
236.
265. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 243, at 390; 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 49.07, at 251-
52. "Contemporaneous interpretations ranging in duration from as long as seventy to as short
as five years have been found to have established the legislative meaning." Id. at 252 (footnote
omitted).
266. D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 49.05, at 238.
267. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1293, 1482 (1982).
268. 2A D. SANDS, supra note 240, § 49.10, at 261-62.
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tion to the two cases in question.
4. Summary. Our position regarding Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)
and the cash seller is that Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) has no application
to a seller who is seeking to reclaim goods under UCC sections 2-507(2) and
2-511(3). This conclusion is based primarily on Bankruptcy Code section
546(c)'s literal language, which not only makes no reference to the cash
seller, but also specifically limits that section's application to reclamation
rights premised upon the buyer/debtor's receipt of the goods while insol-
vent. This restriction on Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) clearly excludes
sellers proceeding under UCC sections 2-507(2) and 2-511(3). Our conclu-
sion is bolstered by the longstanding rule favoring cash sellers over de-
frauded credit sellers, and by the fact that reading Bankruptcy Code section
546(c) to cover the bad check seller would render his rights completely nu-
gatory. In reaching this conclusion, we have carefully considered both the
legislative history of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) and the judicial inter-
pretations of that section. In both instances the evidence is scanty and un-
compelling, especially when considered in light of the clear and
unambiguous language of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c). The legislative
history is far from overwhelming because of its paucity, inconsistency, and
ambiguity. The judicial authority is also scanty, not authoritative, and
otherwise unpersuasive. As a result, we find the legislative history and the
judicial interpretations unilluminating and conclude that the literal language
of Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) should control. That language clearly
and unambiguously does not include sellers who proceed under UCC sec-
tions 2-507(2) and 2-511(3).
C. The Cash Seller Outside Bankruptcy Code Section 546(c)
Clearly, reclaiming sellers who are outside Bankruptcy Code section
546(c)'s coverage are not thereby precluded from recovering against the
trustee. 269 Although Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) has been held to be
the exclusive provision governing the reclamation rights of the sellers that
section covers, reclaimants not within the section's purview should proceed
against the trustee much as under prior bankruptcy law. Having concluded
that the cash seller is not covered by Bankruptcy Code section 546(c), we
now examine the cash seller's prospects when he proceeds against a trustee
employing the successors to Bankruptcy Act sections 70(c) and 60. These
successor provisions change little of the prior law. Thus, the cash seller who
could reclaim from his buyer should also defeat the trustee under these pro-
visions, and thus should generally be successful in bankruptcy.
1. Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a). Section 544(a)(1) 270 of the Bankruptcy
269. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Walters (In re Walters), 17 Bankr. 644, 648 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) (right to reclaim can be exercised in circumstances other than those covered
by Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)).
270. Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(1) provides:
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Code, the successor to Bankruptcy Act section 70(c), gives the trustee the
rights of a hypothetical, ideal judicial lien creditor as of the commencement
of the bankruptcy case. 271 Thus, Bankruptcy Code section 544(a)(1) is vir-
tually identical to Bankruptcy Act section 70(c). 272 As before, the trustee's
ability to prevail depends upon whether such an ideal creditor can defeat the
claimant under state law. 273 Since the cash seller should defeat a lien credi-
tor under the UCC, the cash seller also should overcome a trustee utilizing
section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
2. Bankruptcy Code Section 547. For our purposes, at least, section 547
of the Bankruptcy Code, 274 the successor to Bankruptcy Act section 60, does
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without re-
gard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of,
or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is avoidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commence-
ment of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit,
a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could
have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists.
The Bankruptcy Code defines a lien as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Id. § 101(28). The Bankruptcy Code
defines a judicial lien as a "lien obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or
equitable process or proceeding." Id. § 101(27). The UCC defines a lien creditor as "a credi-
tor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like" and as
"a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition." U.C.C. § 9-301(3) (1978).
Thus, the hypothetical creditor in whose shoes the Bankruptcy Code § 544(a)(1) trustee sits is
substantially the same as the UCC lien creditor and each is much the same as the creditor
whose rights the trustee assumed under Bankruptcy Act § 70(c). See 4 W. COLLIER, supra
note 5, 544.02, at 544-4 to -7.
271. The Bankruptcy Code defines the commencement of the case as the time of the filing
of the petition. Bankruptcy Code §§ 301, 303(b). This was the time the ideal lien creditor's
lien was deemed to have been created under prior law. See supra note 107 and accompanying
text. The Bankruptcy Code also contains new language setting the date of the petition as the
time when the obligation underlying the creditor's lien attaches. Bankruptcy Code
§ 544(a)(1). One effect of this new language is to negate the portion of In re Federal's Inc., 553
F.2d 509, 514 (6th Cir. 1977), that held that while the lien creditor's hypothetical lien must be
regarded as having arisen on the date of bankruptcy, the obligation underlying that lien may
have arisen at some other time.
272. "Subsection (a) is the 'strong arm clause' of current law, now found in Bankruptcy
Act section 70(c)." 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 259, at 85.
273. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, 544.02, at 544-8 to -9.
274. Bankruptcy Code § 547(b) states:
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the
petition, if such creditor, at the time of such transfer was an
insider;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
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not significantly modify the treatment of preferential transfers. For most
transfers, Bankruptcy Code section 547 reduces the time period within
which a preference can occur from four months before the filing of the peti-
tion to 90 days before that time.275 Transfer to insiders occurring between
90 days and one year of the petition, however, can be preferential. 276 Bank-
ruptcy Code section 547 also eliminates Bankruptcy Act section 60's re-
quirement that there be reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's
insolvency. The Bankruptcy Code essentially retains the Bankruptcy Act's
definition of insolvency, 277 but creates a new presumption that the debtor is
insolvent during the 90 days preceding the petition.278 The net effect of
these changes on the reclaiming seller is not substantial, since the seller will
typically not be an insider, he will be able to safely repossess roughly one
month later than under the Bankruptcy Act. The argument that the seller
lacked reasonable cause to believe in the debtor's insolvency, however, will
no longer be available to the seller. Also, the seller will be somewhat disad-
vantaged by the way the new presumption of insolvency lessens the trustee's
evidentiary burden.
In other relevant respects though, Bankruptcy Code section 547 largely
tracks prior law on the subject of preferential transfers.279 For that reason,
the four major arguments for the nonpreferential nature of a cash seller's
repossession should also be persuasive under the Bankruptcy Code.280 The
first argument was that since the debtor's contemporaneous payment for
value received in a cash sale was not for or on account of an antecedent debt,
neither was the cash seller's prompt repossession following the buyer's fail-
ure to pay. 281 Instead, the reclamation should have been viewed as relating
back to the time the debt arose. The Bankruptcy Code now codifies the rule
that a transfer by the debtor is not preferential if the transfer is a contempo-
raneous exchange for new value flowing from the creditor.282 Thus, the first
argument would seem to be at least as valid under Bankruptcy Code section
547 as it was under Bankruptcy Act section 60.
The second argument, that a cash seller's repossession did not diminish
the debtor's estate,283 also relied to some degree on the rule that in a cash
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided
by the provisions of this title.
275. Id.
276. Id. § 547(b)(4)(B). For the Bankruptcy Code's elaborate definition of the term in-
sider, see Bankruptcy Code § 101(25). Hardly ever will the reclaiming cash seller fit within
this definition.
277. Compare Bankruptcy Code § 101(26) with Bankruptcy Act § 1(19).
278. Bankruptcy Code § 547(f).
279. Also, the Bankruptcy Code defines the term "transfer" much as did the Bankruptcy
Act. Compare Bankruptcy Code § 101(40) with Bankruptcy Act § 1(30).
280. To date, no decisions have involved the cash seller's position under Bankruptcy Code
§ 547. The exercise of the UCC § 2-705 right of stoppage in transit, however, was held not
preferential. See In re Fabric Buys, 34 Bankr. 471, 472 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
281. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
282. See Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(1); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 5, 547.37(2) (ex-
plaining the provision). Under Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(1) payment by check is equivalent
to a cash payment. 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, 547.37(2), at 547-119.
283. See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
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sale the debtor's contemporaneous payment in exchange for new value was
not preferential. In this case, the rationale for the rule was that such trans-
fers did not diminish the debtor's estate. Applying this rationale, we con-
tended that the cash seller's prompt repossession after the debtor's failure to
pay deserved to be treated like the contemporaneous payment in exchange
for new value because the underlying transaction was the same and the net
dollar effect quite similar. This conclusion was bolstered by the rule that
neither a diminution of the estate nor a preference occurred when the owner
of property that had been stolen, misappropriated, converted, or fraudu-
lently obtained stood on his rights of ownership and reclaimed the property.
We believed that this rule was sufficiently broad to cover the unpaid cash
seller. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the rule regarding contempora-
neous cash transfers for new value has been codified in the Bankruptcy
Code. 284 Consequently, despite the lack of an express statutory reference in
Bankruptcy Code section 547, the requirement that the transfer must dimin-
ish the estate continues.285 The rule that prompt repossession of stolen, mis-
appropriated, converted, or fraudulently obtained property does not reduce
the estate likewise continues.286 Thus, the second argument seems equally
persuasive under the Bankruptcy Code as under prior law.
The third argument was also based on the rule regarding stolen, misappro-
priated, converted, or fraudulently obtained property, a rule we regarded as
applicable to the unpaid cash seller. The repossessing owner of such prop-
erty was not a creditor under Bankruptcy Act section 60.287 Although the
Bankruptcy Code definition of the term creditor differs from that contained
in the Bankruptcy Act,288 the rule upon which the third argument was based
persists.289 The reclaiming cash seller is therefore unlikely to be deemed a
creditor under Bankruptcy Code section 547.
The final argument, that repossession by an unpaid cash seller was non-
preferential, rested on the cash seller's ability to defeat the trustee in a recla-
mation proceeding occurring after the bankruptcy petition.290 If a seller
who waited until after the date of bankruptcy to assert his rights could de-
feat the trustee, we contended, the seller who acted with more dispatch
should also prevail. This argument seems equally persuasive under the
Bankruptcy Code.29 1 Since the cash seller who mounts a bankruptcy recla-
284. See Bankruptcy Code § 547(c)(1).
285. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, 547.21.
286. See id. 547.23.
287. See supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
288. Compare Bankruptcy Code § 101(9) with Bankruptcy Act § 1(11).
289. See 4 W. COLLIER, supra note 5, 547.19.
290. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
291. Cf National Sugar Ref. Co. v. C. Czarnikow, Inc. (In re National Sugar Ref. Co.), 27
Bankr. 565, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stoppage by seller in transit); In re Fabric Buys, 34 Bankr.
471, 476 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (recovery of goods). Both decisions used Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c)'s protection of the repossessing UCC credit seller to argue that the trustee should not
be able to defeat an exercise of the right of stoppage in transit. As one of these courts stated:
[11f by section 546(c), Congress has ruled that a seller's recovery of goods re-
ceived by an insolvent buyer is not, when proper written notice is given, a prefer-
ential transfer, then recovery of the goods before they reach the buyer must be
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mation petition should emerge victorious under Bankruptcy Code section
544(a), the trustee should be precluded from successfully attacking as prefer-
ential a pre-bankruptcy reclamation by an otherwise similarly situated seller.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING THE CASH SELLER
Thus far, this Article has been both descriptive and prescriptive, combin-
ing an account of the current state of the law with recommendations regard-
ing the course the law should take. This section is almost completely
prescriptive. It begins by restating and summarizing the authors' position
regarding the rights of the cash seller who reclaims under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The section then more fully explicates the policy considera-
tions supporting this position.
A. Summary of Our Position
Although the textual discussion of the matter was equivocal, we believe
that UCC section 2-507(2) should apply solely to those cash sales not involv-
ing payment by check or draft, and UCC section 2-511(3) should be the lone
provision governing check or draft cases. Regardless of which section is ap-
plicable, the right to reclaim when payment is not made or the check or draft
is dishonored should be regarded as inherent to the section in question and
as in no way dependent on UCC section 2-702(2).292 Moreover, UCC sec-
tion 2-702(2)'s ten-day demand requirement should have no application to
cash sale cases in general, and to bad check cases in particular. Due present-
ment of the check and a demand for reclamation, however, must be made
within a reasonable time after notice of dishonor.
UCC section 2-403 should govern all priority questions involving the com-
peting rights of the UCC cash seller and third parties.2 93 UCC section 2-
403(1) resolves the previous uncertainty surrounding the conflict between
the cash seller and the good faith purchaser by subordinating the former to
the latter. Since most article 9 secured parties qualify as good faith purchas-
ers for value, UCC section 2-403(1) also enables these parties to defeat the
reclaiming cash seller. Section 2-403, however, enables the cash seller to
defeat the lien creditor circuitously by compelling reference to UCC section
1-103, which authorizes the use of pre-UCC state law. Under pre-UCC pri-
orityrules the cash seller triumphed over the lien creditor.
When the buyer goes into bankruptcy, the reclaiming cash seller should
usually be able to prevail in a clash with the trustee. Section 546(c) of the
equally exempt. To hold otherwise would mean that a seller who can stop deliv-
ery should instead engage "in the rather absurd behavior of proceeding to de-
liver the goods . . . and immediately thereafter issuing a written demand for
reclamation .... "
In re Fabric Buys, 34 Bankr. at 476 (quoting In re National Sugar Ref. Co., 27 Bankr. at 571).
Just as the seller who exercises his right of stoppage in transit should recover when the re-
claiming seller would do likewise, so should the seller who repossesses before bankruptcy pre-
vail where he could defeat the trustee in a later reclamation petition.
292. See supra notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 176-87 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Code should have no application in such situations. Although
judicial interpretations of the section and the section's legislative history pro-
vide some support for a contrary position, they are decidedly outweighed by
the section's express language, which clearly and unambiguously excludes
the cash seller. As a result, a trustee wishing to defeat the cash seller's recla-
mation petition must utilize other bankruptcy provisions. The two weapons
in the trustee's arsenal best suited for this task, sections 544(a) and 547 of
the Bankruptcy Code, are unlikely to prove sufficient. The trustee's success
under Bankruptcy Code section 544(a) depends upon whether a hypothetical
ideal lien creditor assuming that status on the date of bankruptcy can defeat
a reclaiming cash seller. Since the reclaiming cash seller will defeat a lien
creditor, the cash seller will also defeat a trustee utilizing Bankruptcy Code
section 544(a). For a number of reasons articulated above, the reclaiming
cash seller should also overcome a trustee asserting that the reclamation is
preferential under Bankruptcy Code section 547. To summarize, a seller
who complies with either UCC section 2-507(2) or section 2-511(3) should
be able to reclaim from the buyer, lien creditors of the buyer, and the buyer's
trustee. Good faith purchasers from the buyer and article 9 secured parties,
however, generally have rights in the goods superior to those of the re-
claiming cash seller.
This interpretation of the cash seller's reclamation rights is in marked
contrast to the results that should obtain when a credit seller attempts to
reclaim goods sold to the buyer. Unlike the unpaid cash seller, an unsecured
credit seller is ordinarily unable to reclaim the goods upon the buyer's failure
to pay. Instead, such a seller is limited to such damages as the UCC makes
available. 294 Only when the specific conditions of UCC section 2-702(2) are
met can the credit seller reclaim. These conditions impose procedural limi-
tations on the exercise of the credit sale reclamation right that are more
restrictive than those we believe should apply to the cash seller. The credit
seller may reclaim only if the buyer is insolvent and, in most cases, only if
demand has been made within ten days after the receipt of the goods. 295 The
cash sale reclamation right, on the other hand, is clearly not premised on the
buyer's insolvency, and the ten-day demand limitation should not apply in
the cash sale context. In addition, the UCC seems to give the reclaiming
cash seller more remedial options than the reclaiming credit seller. UCC
section 2-702(3) provides that the seller's reclamation of the goods excludes
all other remedies. In contrast, neither UCC section 2-507(2) nor section 2-
511(3) contains such a limitation.296 In a proper case, accordingly, the cash
294. See U.C.C. § 2-703 (1978).
295. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. The exception to the ten-day demand
requirement is the situation in which a misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the
seller within three months before delivery.
296. Moreover, U.C.C. § 2-721 (1978) states: "Remedies for material misrepresentation or
fraud include all remedies available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach. Neither
rescission or a claim for recission of the contract for sale nor rejection or return of the goods
shall bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other remedy." This section
would apply if a UCC § 2-507(2) or § 2-511(3) situation were considered fraud. We view such
situations as at least fraudulent and as often criminal. See infra note 299. Moreover, UCC
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seller may be able to reclaim and still recover various types of damages from
the buyer.297 Recovery of such damages is foreclosed to the credit seller who
successfully reclaims the goods under UCC section 2-702.
The reclaiming cash seller should also fare better against third parties
than his credit sale counterpart. Here the main difference between the two
sellers occurs in the bankruptcy context. Under UCC sections 2-403(1) and
2-702(3) both the cash and credit sellers will be subordinate to a good faith
purchaser for value.298 For that reason, both sellers should also lose to a
party with a security interest in the goods. Despite the tremendous confu-
sion on this question, however, both the cash and credit sellers should defeat
a lien creditor's competing interest in the goods. In bankruptcy the UCC
section 2-702 seller's fate is exclusively controlled by Bankruptcy Code sec-
tion 546(c), while the cash seller's prospects are determined under other
Bankruptcy Code provisions. Because Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s
ten-day written demand limitation will often pose a major obstacle to recla-
mation and because no ten-day limitation should apply in most cash sale
cases, the credit seller should fare less well in bankruptcy than his cash sale
counterpart.
B. Policy Considerations
1. In General. While the conclusions summarized above are justified by
technical legal arguments of all sorts, those conclusions also comport with
important and well-established policies of a more general nature. First, the
different recovery rights possessed by cash and credit sellers reflect the differ-
ent expectations sellers entertain when they enter into these distinct types of
bargains. A seller who contracts on cash terms has not agreed to extend
credit and, as a result, has not agreed to assume the risks attendant upon an
extension of credit. Instead, the cash seller has bargained for a substantially
simultaneous exchange of the goods and their price, with the expectation
that in doing so he is achieving a greater measure of security than would be
the case in a credit sale. Second, giving the cash seller greater recovery
rights than the credit seller is justified by the idea that the more egregious
forms of buyer behavior should trigger correspondingly greater powers of
reclamation in the seller. The buyer conduct enabling the cash seller to re-
claim the goods involves something more serious than mere fraud. In fact,
such behavior may sometimes be criminal. 299 In the ordinary credit sale
§ 2-702(2) makes itself the exclusive reclamation remedy whereas neither UCC § 2-507(2) nor
§ 2-511(3) imposes such a limitation. Consequently, neither UCC § 2-507(2) nor § 2-511(3) is
exclusive and neither displaces pre-UCC law. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
297. See U.C.C. §§ 2-706, -708 to -710 (1978).
298. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text; see also U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1978),
which states that the seller's reclamation right under UCC § 2-702(2) is "subject to the rights
of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403)."
299. One who obtains property through the knowing use of a bad check can be guilty of
obtaining property by false pretenses, and may also be criminally liable under the bad check
statutes enacted by some states. A. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 98 (1975). In
addition, the buyer behavior involved in noncheck cash sale cases may well be larceny.
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case, by contrast, UCC section 2-709's action for the price is triggered by
nothing more significant than the buyer's failure to make a payment when
due. Even in a credit sale case involving section 2-702(2), there is only "a
tacit business misrepresentation of solvency" which is "fraudulent as against
the particular seller. ''3°°
Third, extending greater reclamation rights to cash sellers may sometimes
benefit financially troubled buyers. Unless sellers take the time and trouble
to obtain and perfect a purchase money security interest in the goods sold,
they may be disinclined to deal with buyers whose future ability to pay is
questionable. In such cases, the option of dealing on cash terms provides
suppliers with an incentive to sell that otherwise might be lacking. This is
implicitly recognized by UCC section 2-702(1), which provides that when a
seller discovers that a buyer is insolvent the seller may refuse to deliver the
goods except for cash.30 1 This section suggests that the UCC's drafters re-
garded a cash sale as a relatively secure transaction, so secure, in fact, that it
could safely be entered into with an insolvent party. In such situations the
availability of the cash sale option serves both the buyer's and the seller's
interests. The option enables the seller to avoid throwing good goods after
bad. Moreover, the option may provide a last hope for the financially dis-
tressed buyer, who in order to have any chance of survival must continue to
purchase the raw materials, equipment, and inventory needed to keep the
business in operation.
2. In Cases Involving Nonbankruptcy Third Parties. The policy considera-
tions just stated clearly justify the cash seller's preferred position in cases in
which the seller seeks simply to recover goods from the buyer. When the
rights of third parties are involved, however, the situation becomes more
complicated. Here, the policies discussed above must be balanced against
the important societal interest in promoting the free transferability of goods.
In the case of the good faith purchaser for value, the UCC has effectively
struck the balance in favor of free transferability by unambiguously declar-
ing that the good faith purchaser will defeat the cash seller.
The social interest in the free transferability of goods, however, is not so
clearly implicated when the third party is an unsecured creditor 30 2 who has
attached goods sold the buyer in order to satisfy the debt. Good faith pur-
chasers are entitled to defeat the seller's competing claim to the goods be-
cause a contrary rule would create disincentives to buy and would thus
frustrate the free movement of goods. Thus, the good faith purchaser is. al-
lowed to assume that the buyer's possession of the goods evidences the ab-
sence of competing claims to them. The lien creditor, however, is not a
purchaser but a creditor, and, because the lien creditor does not rely upon
the buyer's possession of the goods, the societal interest in free transferability
300. U.C.C. § 2-702 comment 2 (1978).
301. Id. § 2-702(1).
302. A secured creditor is generally considered to be a good faith purchaser for value who
will defeat the cash seller. This result is based on the secured party's reliance upon the buyer's
possession of the goods.
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of goods is not involved. In the case of the lien creditor the relevant policy
issue is fairness and equity among creditors. 30 3 This issue is resolved in
favor of a credit seller proceeding under UCC section 2-702(2). Such a cred-
itor will generally defeat a lien creditor with a competing interest in the
goods. Due to the various policy considerations favoring the cash seller over
the UCC section 2-702(2) seller, this result may dispose of the cash sale
question as well, but additional reasons for favoring the cash seller over the
lien creditor also exist. A cash seller is better characterized as the owner of
the goods than as a creditor. Unlike the credit seller, he has not extended
credit to the buyer. The practical effect of the buyer's failure to pay or the
dishonor of the buyer's check is to defeat the buyer's right to retain the
goods. Consequently, the principle of equality among creditors has little or
no application when a cash seller and a lien creditor assert competing rights
to goods sold the buyer. Here, the protection of the seller's property inter-
ests and the expectations with which he contracted is of considerably greater
weight than the free transferability of goods or the goal of achieving fairness
among creditors. Moreover, the relatively secure position accorded the cash
seller may sometimes work to the advantage of the buyer's unsecured credi-
tors if the cash seller's greater security induces sales to financially troubled
buyers and thus enables those buyers to stay afloat.
3. In Bankruptcy. In the bankruptcy context the general policy of achiev-
ing fairness and equity among creditors is of prime importance. 3°4 Section
546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, by establishing a virtually unqualified right
to reclaim once certain procedural requirements have been met, balances the
equities in a fashion generally favoring the reclaiming credit seller. Thus,
due to the many policy reasons for favoring the cash seller over the credit
seller, the cash seller's ability to reclaim goods from the trustee should be at
least as great as that afforded the credit seller by Bankruptcy Code section
546(c). Including the cash seller within Bankruptcy Code section 546(c),
however, is not the way to achieve this result. General considerations of
policy combine with the provision's clear language to exclude the cash seller
from Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) so that the cash seller's fate is deter-
mined under such other provisions as the trustee can bring to bear in at-
tempting to defeat the cash seller's reclamation. The trustee's efforts to
defeat the cash seller under such provisions, however, will almost certainly
fail. 305
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s ten-day written demand requirement is
a fairly significant check on the credit seller's ability to reclaim. 3°6 In the
303. Cf U.C.C. § 2-702 comment 3 (1978) (because UCC § 2-702(2) reclamation right
constitutes preferential treatment as against buyer's other creditors, UCC § 2-702(3) provides
that reclamation bars seller's other remedies as to the goods).
304. Here we assume arguendo that the unpaid cash seller is a creditor.
305. See supra notes 269-91 and accompanying text.
306. As one court has put the matter:
The court recognizes that to give exclusive effect to section 546(c) permits a
debtor, who either actively or passively defrauds a seller of goods in the ordinary
course of business, to insulate such fraudulent transactions unless the seller
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cash sale context, however, the demand requirement's effect on the seller's
chances of recovery is even more pronounced. If Bankruptcy Code section
546(c) is read to include the cash seller and to constitute the reclaiming
seller's sole recourse in bankruptcy, the cash sale reclamation right will be
rendered virtually useless once the buyer becomes bankrupt. Most cash
sales involve checks, and due to delays in the check collection process, few
cash sellers will be informed of the buyer's dishonor in time to act. More-
over, even when the cash seller does receive prompt notification of dishonor,
Bankruptcy Code section 546(c)'s requirement that the ten-day demand be
in writing creates somewhat greater compliance problems than the UCC's
less rigorous demand rule. Thus, the likely result of including the cash seller
within Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) is that relatively few cash sellers will
qualify for the protection that the section theoretically affords. Credit sell-
ers, on the other hand, will fare better under the section because they will
not confront the check collection delays impeding the cash seller's ability to
recover. Such an outcome frustrates the many policy reasons for favoring
the cash seller over the credit seller.
If Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) is held applicable to cash sellers, thus
precluding almost all cash sale reclamations, the cash seller will be required
to adopt various means of protection when dealing with buyers of marginal
solvency. Each of these means has adverse effects that outweigh the small
benefit the bankrupt buyer's other creditors derive from the cash seller's in-
ability to reclaim. The first alternative is for the seller to refuse to accept a
check and to demand legal tender. 30 7 Unfortunately, legal tender presents
significant risks of theft and loss, especially when the parties are distant or
the sum involved is large. Demanding legal tender also can cause delays in
consummating sales, particularly since banks may not always have sufficient
amounts on hand. In sum, this alternative is a large step backward in the
conduct of commercial relations.
The second alternative for the seller is to negotiate an agreement permit-
ting him to withhold delivery of the goods until the buyer's check clears. 308
complies with the conditions therein. The court also recognizes that to limit the
right of a defrauded seller to recover property only if he complies with the con-
ditions set forth in section 546(c), for all practical purposes, makes the right
meaningless. The event that generally triggers demand for reclamation is the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy. Unless the filing of the petition is preceded by
extensive publicity, a seller will ordinarily not be able to comply with the condi-
tions set forth in section 546(c). A court, however, does not have the power to
legislate; it must merely accept what the legislature has written.
B. Berger Co. v. Contract Interiors, Inc. (In re Contract Interiors, Inc.), 14 Bankr. 670, 675-76
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (footnote omitted); see also Roberts v. L.T.S., Inc. (In re L.T.S.,
Inc.), 32 Bankr. 907, 909 n.2 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1983) (admitting that Bankruptcy Code
§ 546(c) poses difficult requirement for reclaiming sellers); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v.
Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators, Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 922 (Bankr. W.D.
Ky. 1983) (Bankruptcy Code § 546(c)'s protection "self-neutralizing").
307. U.C.C. § 2-511(2) (1978) confers this right by stating: "Tender of payment is suffi-
cient when made by any means or in any manner current in the ordinary course of business
unless the seller demands payment in legal tender and gives any extension of time reasonably
necessary to procure it."
308. U.C.C. § 2-507(1) (1978) states: "Tender of delivery is a condition to the buyer's duty
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This alternative would cause delay in delivery and, because withholding de-
livery is an unusual business practice, may diminish the seller's prospects of
making sales. Also, determining when the check is actually paid may be
inconvenient or difficult. These drawbacks may not assume much signifi-
cance in an isolated deal with an agreeable or desperate buyer, but their
aggregate impact is likely to be substantial if the seller regularly tries to deal
on this basis.
The seller's third alternative is to take and perfect a security interest. This
approach will frequently ensure the seller's ability to recover the goods in
bankruptcy, 30 9 but it is also inconvenient and costly, especially if practiced
on a regular basis.3 10 More importantly, while this strategy is regularly em-
ployed in credit sales, perfecting a security interest is almost completely at
odds with the nature of a cash transaction. For a seller to have his buyer
sign a security agreement while accepting that buyer's check seems rather
ludicrous. A check, after all, is ordinarily regarded as a payment, not a
credit, instrument.
The last of the cash seller's alternatives, requiring a certified check from
the buyer, is perhaps the most feasible of his options. Like a demand for
legal tender, however, demanding a certified check causes delay and incon-
venience. On the other hand, this alternative does not involve the safety
risks presented by true cash transactions. Since banks customarily charge
their customers for certified checks, demanding a certified check does create
additional expense for the buyer. This may cause the seller to lose sales he
otherwise would have made, or may cause the seller to lose profits as he
reduces his selling price to reflect the cost of certification.
Finally, all of these alternatives share an additional important disadvan-
tage. Unlike the cash seller's exercise of the right to reclaim, these alterna-
tives will be employed many more times than actually needed. If a seller
could determine in advance which of his buyers is likely to pay with a bad
check, he could employ one of the methods just discussed in those cases and
only in those cases. Such knowledge, of course, is often not readily available
to sellers, and obtaining that knowledge usually involves considerable time,
effort, and expense. As a result, a seller who employs these means of protec-
tion ordinarily must engage in overkill, utilizing the protective measures
whenever the buyer's solvency is even remotely in doubt. The likely conse-
quences are economic waste, unnecessary delays, and unjustified inconve-
niences. Allowing the cash seller to reclaim in the small percentage of cases
to accept the goods and, unless otherwise agreed, to his duty to pay for them." Id. § 2-507
comment 2 explains that the "unless otherwise agreed" language is directed primarily to cases
in which payment in advance has been promised.
309. A secured party who perfects before the date of bankruptcy, for instance, will defeat a
trustee proceeding under Bankruptcy Code § 544(a). H. BAILEY, supra note 89, at 311. Some
perfected security interests, however, may be preferential under Bankruptcy Code § 547. H.
BAILEY, supra note 89, at 312-22.
310. Admittedly, the secured party is not required to file to perfect when his interest is a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-302(l)(d) (1981). Most liti-
gated cash sale cases, however, are not consumer goods transactions.
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in which reclamation is necessary for his protection largely eliminates these
results.
V. CONCLUSION
Article 2 of the UCC is commonly regarded as bearing the imprint of
American legal realism,3 11 fostering a regime of broad standards3 12 with the
flexibility needed to accommodate the variegated patterns and inevitable
changes of commercial life.3 13 Viewed through different eyes, though, the
legal realist influence has been less a facilitator of necessary adaptation and
change than a stimulant toward incoherence and confusion.3 14 Taken in iso-
lation, UCC sections 2-507(2), 2-511(3), and 2-702(2) seem to elude either
characterization. Instead, those sections state relatively clear rules capable
of more or less easy application to the buyer/seller relations that they gov-
ern. 3 1 Nevertheless, the interaction of these sections with federal bank-
ruptcy law and the UCC priority problems triggered thereby are another
story entirely. Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code is an obvious reaction
to the incoherence that preceded it. 316 Whether this section's rigid, mechan-
ical ten-day written demand requirement 31 7 provides a superior basis for bal-
ancing the competing claims of reclaiming sellers and the bankrupt's other
creditors, however, is open to question.
Our reservations about Bankruptcy Code section 546(c) have particular
force in the case of the cash seller. For a considerable period, the cash sale
has provided sellers with the option of not extending credit while following
the customary business practice of accepting a check in payment. Sellers
pursuing this option generally had greater recovery rights against the buyer
and various third parties than did their credit sale counterparts. In particu-
lar, the cash seller has traditionally been able to recover from his buyer's
trustee in bankruptcy. Under the UCC the seller continues to enjoy the op-
311. Speidel, Restatement Second.: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 785, 790 (1982). This is mainly due to Karl Llewellyn's role as principal draftsman of
article 2.
312. Id. at 786-92 (discussing the movement from rules to standards in commercial and
contract law generally).
313. "[T]he inevitability of change will render functionless a commercial statute too inflexi-
ble to adapt. The structural simplicity of Article 2 enhances its capacity to respond to the
complexities of the real world, to the large and evolving variety of 'commercial' transactions."
Jackson & Peters, supra note 1, at 984 (footnote omitted).
314. For a suggestion that American legal realism has had tendencies toward nihilism, see
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 80-81 (paperback ed. 1977).
315. The absence of an explicit cash sale reclamation provision and the question whether
UCC § 2-702(2)'s ten-day demand requirement applies to the UCC cash seller are partial ex-
ceptions to this generalization.
316. Cf G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 102 (paperback ed. 1974) (suggesting
movement in law from "classical" periods of order and predictability to "romantic" periods of
confusion, to classical reformulations).
317. One case applying Bankruptcy Code § 546(c) to the cash seller has stated that the
section "does not contain any explanation of why a ten-day demand must be made; neither
does the legislative history provide its justification . . . . The ten-day limit seems, at best,
arbitrary." Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Wathen's Elevators, Inc. (In re Wathen's Elevators,
Inc.), 32 Bankr. 912, 922 n.31 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
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tion of refusing to extend credit and accepting the buyer's check instead.3 1 8
The scattered recent decisions denying cash seller reclamations in bank-
ruptcy do not provide any reason for regarding the cash sale's traditional
role as obsolete. Little in the UCC or the Bankruptcy Code dictates the cash
seller's subservience to the trustee. On the contrary, technical legal reason-
ing and compelling considerations of policy combine to favor the seller.
318. "This Article recognizes that the taking of a seemingly solvent party's check is com-
mercially normal and proper and, if due diligence is exercised in collection, is not to be penal-
ized in any way." U.C.C. § 2-511 comment 4 (1978).
1985]

